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MDL AS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
David L . Noll*
From the Deepwater Horizon disaster to the opioid crisis, multidistrict litiga-
tion—or simply MDL—has become the preeminent forum for devising solu-
tions to the most difficult problems in the federal courts . MDL works by
refusing to follow a regular procedural playbook . Its solutions are case specif-
ic, evolving, and ad hoc . This very flexibility, however, provokes charges that
MDL violates basic requirements of the rule of law .
At the heart of these charges is the assumption that MDL is simply a larger
version of the litigation that takes place every day in federal district courts .
But MDL is not just different in scale than ordinary litigation; it is different
in kind . In structure and operation, MDL parallels programs like Social Se-
curity in which an administrative agency continuously develops new proce-
dures to handle a high volume of changing claims . Accordingly, MDL is
appropriately judged against the “administrative” rule of law that emerged in
the decades after World War II and underpins the legitimacy of the modern
administrative state .
When one views MDL as an administrative program instead of a larger ver-
sion of ordinary civil litigation, the real threats to its legitimacy come into fo-
cus . The problem is not that MDL is ad hoc . Rather, it is that MDL lacks the
guarantees of transparency, public participation, and ex post review that
administrative agencies have operated under since the middle of the twenti-
eth century . The history of the administrative state suggests that MDL’s con-
tinued success as a forum for resolving staggeringly complex problems
depends on how it addresses these governance deficits .
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INTRODUCTION
In a widely publicized December 2017 order, the Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation (JPML) transferred all litigation involving the sale and
distribution of opioids that was pending in federal court to the Northern
District of Ohio for coordinated pretrial proceedings.1 No sooner had the
cases been transferred to Ohio than the judge assigned to manage them, Dan
Aaron Polster, announced he did not intend to follow the usual order of
business under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).2 “The federal
court[s],” Polster said, “[are] probably the least likely branch of government
to try and tackle” the opioid crisis. “[B]ut candidly, the other branches of
government, federal and state, have punted.”3 Noting that around 150 Amer-
icans were dying every day from opioid overdoses, Polster declared he want-
ed the parties to devise a settlement that would “do something meaningful to
abate this crisis.”4 And he wanted it within a year.5
Twenty months into the litigation, Judge Polster’s attempts to forge a
global opioid settlement had yet to bear fruit.6 His remarks, however, pro-
vide a revealing window into the world of modern multidistrict litigation, or
simply “MDL.” From the Deepwater Horizon disaster to the opioid crisis,
MDL has become the preeminent forum for working out solutions to the
most intractable problems in the federal courts.7 To do so, judges and law-
yers devise ad hoc solutions to problems of organization, settlement, and
management that arise in particular cases. As expressed by one judge: “I see
ways to change course each time, new ways to tweak it. . . . Every case is dif-
ferent.”8 As expressed by another, “Practices are always evolving.”9
1 . In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2017); see, e .g .,
Dave Bangert, City Joins Opioid Suit amid Crisis, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 23, 2017, at A5;
Mitch Smith & Monica Davey, With Overdoses on Rise, Cities and Counties Look for Someone
to Blame, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/us/opioid-cities-
counties-lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/H2MY-GNJL].
2 . See Transcript of Proceedings at 4, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-
CV-2804 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 2018), ECF No. 71.
3 . Id .
4 . Id .
5 . Id .
6 . See Jan Hoffman, Opioid Lawsuits Are Headed to Trial . Here’s Why the Stakes Are
Getting Uglier ., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/30/health
/opioid-lawsuits-settlement-trial.html [https://perma.cc/AJZ7-MUNJ].
7 . See, e .g ., Christa Case Bryant & Henry Gass, An Unprecedented Effort to Stem Opioid
Crisis—and the Judge Behind It, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 9, 2018), https://
www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2018/0509/An-unprecedented-effort-to-stem-opioid-crisis-
and-the-judge-behind-it [https://perma.cc/77FX-CH2E]; Campbell Robertson et al., BP to Pay
$18 .7 Billion for Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2015), https://www.ny
times.com/2015/07/03/us/bp-to-pay-gulf-coast-states-18-7-billion-for-deepwater-horizon-oil-
spill.html [https://perma.cc/3LSF-EL8L].
8. Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place
in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1689 (2017).
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As MDL has grown in importance, critics have charged that its proce-
dural flexibility violates the rule of law. The charges come from both sides of
the “v.” Focusing on MDL’d plaintiffs, legal scholars contend that MDL’s
lack of regular procedure allows the lawyers who control it to enrich them-
selves at the expense of plaintiffs for whom they perform “common benefit”
work.10 At the same time, large corporate defendants have joined long-
standing academic complaints about MDL’s ad hockery.11 Citing statistics
that purport to show that MDL’d cases make up more than 40 percent of the
federal docket, defense groups argue that MDL’s unstructured procedure en-
courages the filing of meritless claims and subjects them to unfair settlement
pressure.12
The attack on MDL took on new urgency as the corporate defense bar
mobilized behind reforms that would subject MDL to its own procedural
rules.13 In late 2017, three interest groups persuaded the Advisory Commit-
tee on Civil Rules to form a subcommittee to study MDL-specific amend-
ments to the FRCP.14 If those amendments are adopted, MDL would for the
first time be subject to rules other than those in the ordinary Federal Rules.15
Also in 2017, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 985, the “Fairness in
Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act,”
9 . Id . The respondents in Professor’s Gluck survey were granted anonymity. They in-
cluded “twenty judges (fifteen federal, five state), each with significant experience in MDL.” Id .
at 1675.
10. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV.
67, 106–07 (2017); see also infra note 143 (collecting further scholarship on agency problems in
MDL).
11 . See, e .g ., JOHN H. BEISNER ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, MDL
PROCEEDINGS: ELIMINATING THE CHAFF (2015), https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com
/uploads/sites/1/MDL_Proceedings_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/275R-7JBM]; Max Heckendorn
& Steven E. Swaney, Meritless Claims Create Inefficiencies in Multidistrict Litigation, LEXBLOG:
PRODUCT LIABILITY & MASS TORTS BLOG (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.lexblog.com/2019/02
/12/meritless-claims-create-inefficiencies-in-multidistrict-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/SE5B-
4UAX].
12 . See LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, MDL PRACTICES AND THE NEED FOR FRCP
AMENDMENTS (2018) [hereinafter LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, MDL PRACTICES], https://
static.reuters.com/resources/media/editorial/20181004/rules4mdl--proposalsforrulescommit
tee.pdf [https://perma.cc/DUS2-59KV]; LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, REQUEST FOR
RULEMAKING TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 14-15 (2017) [hereinafter
LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, REQUEST FOR RULEMAKING], http://www.lfcj.com/uploads/1/1/2
/0/112061707/lcj_request_for_rulemaking_concerning_mdl_cases_8-10-17.pdf [https://perma
.cc/FS64-AKXY]; Jay B. Stephens et al., Multidistrict Litigation: Reducing Incentives for Abuse,
WASH. LEGAL FOUND.: CONVERSATIONS WITH…, Autumn 2017, at 1, 1. For an explanation of
why the 40 percent figure is misleading, see Margaret S. Williams, The Effect of Multidistrict
Litigation on the Federal Judiciary over the Past 50 Years, 53 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019)
(manuscript at 19–20) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
13 . See generally Andrew D. Bradt, The Looming Battle for Control of Multidistrict Liti-
gation in Historical Perspective, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 87 (2018).
14 . Id . at 98.
15 . See id . at 89.
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which included several MDL-related provisions.16 Neither the new subcom-
mittee nor H.R. 985 is likely to result in immediate changes to MDL proce-
dure.17 But they reflect a well-organized, well-funded effort to reform MDL.
That project is explicitly premised on the view that MDL as now practiced
violates the rule of law.18
Does it? This Article argues that one cannot answer that question with-
out a better understanding of what MDL is. As this Article shows, MDL is
not simply a super-sized version of the litigation that takes place every day in
federal court, but a form of public administration that blends tools of ordi-
nary litigation with tools of institutional design more commonly found in
programs such as Social Security. As such, MDL is properly judged against
the “administrative” rule of law that emerged in the United States in the dec-
ades following World War II. From this perspective, MDL’s ad hockery is
less of a concern than the fact that it lacks structural features that underpin
the legitimacy of the federal administrative state.
The attack on MDL draws on a conception of the rule of law that
equates it with fair procedures laid down in advance of disputes.19 The use of
such procedures ensures that courts resolve cases in a predictable manner.
To some, they are essential to the very idea of adjudication. For example,
Lon Fuller argued that “adjudication must act through openly declared rule
or principle, and the grounds on which it acts must display some continuity
through time. Without this, joinder of argument becomes impossible and all
the conventional safeguards that surround decision . . . forfeit their mean-
ing.”20
But this understanding of the rule of law is hardly the only one relevant
to the legitimacy of novel governmental institutions. In countless federal
programs, Congress delegated open-ended authority to an administrative
agency to overcome Congress’s own inability to anticipate the procedures
needed to resolve future cases. MDL follows their lead. The system’s ena-
bling statute, the Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, first authorizes the
JPML to centralize cases before a single district judge.21 It then directs the
judge to conduct “coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings”22—a
directive that judges have interpreted as an instruction to develop ad hoc
16. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017).
17 . See MDL Subcommittee Report, in AGENDA: MEETING OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, APRIL 2–3, 2019, at 207, 207 (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov
/sites/default/files/2019-04_civil_rules_agenda_book.pdf [https://perma.cc/LJ66-V6KL] (not-
ing the subcommittee’s belief that a survey of federal judges may be valuable “but also that such
a survey should be deferred until it is clearer what possible amendment ideas seem most wor-
thy of serious study”).
18 . See RULES 4 MDLS, https://www.rules4mdls.com/ [https://perma.cc/6KN7-KQAC];
infra text accompanying note 153.
19 . See infra text accompanying notes 127–130.
20. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 171–72 (rev. ed. 1969).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)–(b) (2012).
22 . Id .
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procedures to overcome emergent problems. In all of this, MDL follows a
pattern familiar from federal administrative programs, using courts rather
than administrative agencies as its delegate.
If MDL’s procedural flexibility is no big deal, however, other aspects of
its model of aggregate litigation are a source of concern. Responding to criti-
cisms remarkably similar to those leveled at contemporary MDL, midcentu-
ry legal reformers devised alternative structures to protect against arbitrary
action in administrative programs that were not governed by regular court
procedures.23 In brief, those structures aimed to ensure the transparency of
the administrative process (e.g., by requiring advance notice of certain ac-
tions),24 the accessibility of the process (most notably by guaranteeing “an
opportunity to participate” in rulemaking25), and liberal opportunities for
judicial review of agency action. Those structures contributed to a distinctive
administrative conception of the rule of law, which played an important role
in establishing the legitimacy of the modern administrative state. And they
are largely lacking in MDL. The problem, then, is not that MDL is ad hoc.
Rather, it is that MDL lacks the guarantees of transparency, public participa-
tion, and ex post review that underpin modern administration.
This point has a number of implications for debates over MDL reform.
Recognizing the vulnerability of a system that operates without regular pro-
cedure or the guarantees of reasoned decisionmaking that apply to adminis-
trative agencies, corporate defendants and their allies have proposed reforms
that would cripple MDL’s utility as a forum for controversies that cannot be
resolved through regular procedure. For example, Andrew Pollis proposes
that any of the thousands of parties gathered in a large MDL be permitted to
appeal most interlocutory orders that raise an “important issue[] of unsettled
law.”26 That proposal would undoubtedly address the immunity from ex-
post review that many of a transferee judge’s decisions currently enjoy. But it
invites strategic abuse that would undermine judges’ ability to manage cases
to resolution.
The choice is not so stark. Reconceiving MDL as a form of public ad-
ministration highlights alternative reforms that would preserve MDL’s dy-
namism while making it more transparent, accessible, and accountable. For
example, MDL judges are not required to publish case management orders
and transcripts of proceedings in a format that is reasonably accessible to
MDL’d plaintiffs and their counsel.27 The nature of lead counsel’s duties to
consolidated plaintiffs—and, conversely, those plaintiffs’ authority to partic-
ipate in case management decisions—is uncertain. And as Pollis notes, many
23 . See infra text accompanying notes 300–306.
24 . See Lotte E. Feinberg, Mr . Justice Brandeis and the Creation of the Federal Register,
61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 359 (2001).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
26. Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in
Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1648 (2011).
27 . See infra note 279.
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case management decisions are effectively final once they are entered.28 Ad-
ministrative law contains models for addressing these shortcomings that
would not cripple MDL’s capacity to resolve complex disputes.
This Article contributes to recent scholarship on ad hoc procedure by
showing how ad hoc procedure is central to the design of section 1407 and
MDL’s ability to resolve complex litigation.29 It also holds insights for two
related literatures.
The first is the burgeoning literature on MDL.30 Unpacking the structur-
al choices that underpin MDL’s model of aggregate litigation, the Article
helps explain the growth of MDL and highlights institutional reforms that
are not apparent when MDL is approached as a larger version of ordinary
civil litigation.
The second literature examines the relationship between court and
agency implementation of federal regulatory programs.31 Legal scholars and
political scientists have long recognized that when Congress enacts a statute,
it chooses between the statute being implemented by courts or an agency (or
agencies) in the first instance. That choice is often said to be exclusive: Con-
gress either charges an agency with implementing the statute (subject to ju-
dicial review), or Congress authorizes courts to hear claims under the
statute.32 But as MDL shows, the border between court and agency imple-
28 . See Pollis, supra note 26, at 1686.
29 . See, e .g ., Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV.
767 (2017); Jessica A. Clarke, The Rules of #MeToo, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2019);
Lindsey Simon, Chapter 11 Shapeshifters, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 233 (2016); Shirin Sinnar, Proce-
dural Experimentation and National Security in the Courts, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 991 (2018).
30 . E .g ., Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the
Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (2017); Burch, supra note 10; Judith
Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 5; Thomas E.
Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate
Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775 (2010); see also Howard M. Erichson,
Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Repre-
sentation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519.
31 . See, e .g ., THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE
OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2002); SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE:
PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010); Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative
Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 47
(1982); Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial and
Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363 (2010); Matthew C. Stephenson, Leg-
islative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and
Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (2006); Edward H. Stiglitz, Delegating for Trust, 166 U. PA. L.
REV. 633 (2018). MDL’s just-in-time procedure-making also resonates with recent work in
“experimentalist” policymaking, though MDL lacks the feedback loops and reliance on self-
regulation that figure prominently in many new governance efforts. See generally Christopher
Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, The Politics of Regulation: From New Institutionalism to New
Governance, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 107 (2011).
32 . E .g ., Fiorina, supra note 31, at 35 (“Congress delegates power to regulatory agencies
instead of passing laws and allowing the courts to oversee their enforcement.” (emphasis omit-
ted)); Lemos, supra note 31, at 434 (“[J]udicial interpretations are likely to be narrower than
those of agencies.”).
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mentation is more porous. In particular, MDL shows how Congress can use
Article III courts to perform functions that are commonly thought to be the
province of administrative agencies and executive departments. Thus, this
Article adds to the small body of legal scholarship highlighting ways in
which the judiciary itself functions as an administrative agency.33 To date,
that literature has focused on idiosyncratic issues such as the Supreme
Court’s certiorari process and choice of policymaking forms.34 These ac-
counts do not consider the elephant in the room of “judicial administration”:
MDL.
Part I of this Article describes the prevalence of ad hoc procedure in
MDL. Part II connects MDL’s ad hockery to the debate over MDL and the
rule of law. It shows that MDL’s use of ad hoc procedure lies at the heart of
the argument that MDL violates the rule of law, and that the recent attack on
MDL approaches it as a form of litigation that is appropriately evaluated
through the norms governing ordinary civil litigation. Part III argues that,
contrary to this conventional wisdom, MDL is best understood as a hybrid
form of public administration. Evaluating MDL through the lens of the ad-
ministrative rule of law, Part III explains that while criticisms that motivate
recent reform proposals miss the mark, MDL lacks structural features that
are central to the legitimacy of the modern administrative state. Part IV ex-
amines the implications for proposals to reform the MDL system.
I. MDL’S “UNORTHODOX CIVIL PROCEDURE”
As Judge Polster’s remarks suggest, MDL is a site of intense procedural
innovation. The attorneys and judges who control MDL do not resolve cases
using a standard procedural playbook but regularly devise new ways of or-
ganizing, investigating, and resolving cases. Analogizing procedural design
in MDL to the explosion of unorthodox legislative pathways in Congress,
Abbe Gluck writes of MDL’s “unorthodox civil procedure.”35 MDL critics
(but not necessarily Gluck) contend that the use of such procedure makes
MDL incompatible with the rule of law.
33 . See, e .g ., Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of
Civil Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188 (2012); Kathryn A.
Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(2011); see also Scott Dodson, Should the Rules Committees Have an Amicus Role?, 104 VA. L.
REV. 1 (2018). This phenomenon is in one sense the converse of administrative agencies mak-
ing judicial procedure, see, e .g ., David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985
(2017); Urja Mittal, Note, Litigation Rulemaking, 127 YALE L.J. 1010 (2018), and the use of
agencies to police access to Article III courts, see David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litiga-
tion Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013). Each of these bodies of work draws on a body of
political science scholarship that “seeks to shift from a focus on the judiciary as an autonomous
bubble, in which judges make policy according to their own preferences, to a focus on the judi-
ciary as an institution that is used, strategically and instrumentally, by the elected branches in
support of their political and policy agendas.” FARHANG, supra note 31, at 32.
34 . See sources cited supra note 33.
35 . See Gluck, supra note 8, at 1669, 1674–75.
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This Part outlines the developments behind that charge, focusing on
“mega”-MDLs36 that motivate proposals in Congress and the rulemaking
process to reform MDL.37 This Part first situates MDL procedure-making
within the larger universe of ad hoc procedure. It then provides a roadmap
to the procedures that have emerged in modern MDL. Finally, it explains the
larger structural features that influence procedure-making in MDL.
A. Ad Hoc Procedure in MDL
While it is widely recognized that MDL is more dynamic than ordinary
civil litigation, it is hardly the only context where ad hoc procedure is found.
In prior scholarship, Pamela Bookman and I surveyed the many contexts in
which lawmakers develop new procedures to address emergent procedural
problems and the kinds of law that formalize these innovations. Ad hoc pro-
cedure is used in state and federal courts, international institutions, and pri-
vate dispute resolution systems.38 It is formalized in federal and state stat-
statutes, court orders, court rules, local rules, special-purpose institutions,
international agreements, contracts, party agreements, and customs that lack
36. The MDL literature conventionally defines “mega”-MDLs as those in which more
than 1,000 actions are transferred to a single court. See, e .g ., John G. Heyburn II, A View from
the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2225, 2230 (2008). Unless the transferee judge
limits joinder under Rule 20, a single action may of course include many plaintiffs and defend-
ants.
37. The JPML compiles some statistics about its activities and the federal MDL docket,
and a handful of researchers have done valuable work on characteristics of MDL’d cases. Judi-
cial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation – Judicial Business 2017, U.S. COURTS, https://www
.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-panel-multidistrict-litigation-judicial-business-2017
[https://perma.cc/Z6A9-LARV]; see, e .g ., Zachary D. Clopton & Andrew D. Bradt, Party Pref-
erences in Multidistrict Litigation, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); Williams, supra note
12. However, no body systematically collects information about the progression of specific
MDLs and how they are resolved. The absence of such data means that claims about how MDL
functions inevitably have an impressionistic quality and invite objections along the lines of:
“That’s not how MDL X worked!”
In the absence of systematic empirical data, this Part relies on Gluck’s interviews with
MDL transferee judges and a review of all publicly available filings and transcripts in three
MDLs that have been litigated over the past decade to describe practice in mega-MDLs. The
MDLs are In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La.) (Fallon, J.), In re
Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La.) (Barbier, J.), and In re
National Prescription Opiate Litigation, MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio) (Polster, J.). I selected
these three MDLs because transcripts of court proceedings were available from the transferee
court or Bloomberg Law’s replica of the district court’s CM/ECF system, and because they
culminated in different types of resolutions: a nonclass aggregate settlement (Vioxx), a series of
class action settlements (Deepwater Horizon), and a litigation that, as of writing, had not been
resolved (Opioids). These litigations are not representative of the universe of MDLs. See Wil-
liams, supra note 12 (manuscript at 22 tbl.2). However, they illustrate the kind of mega-case
that motivated both section 1407’s enactment and current proposals to rule-ify MDL. As such,
they provide a workable sample for evaluating proposals that MDL should be reformed in re-
sponse to problems revealed in mega-MDLs.
38. Bookman & Noll, supra note 29, at 784–92.
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the force of law.39 In short, “[o]nce one begins to look for ad hoc procedure,
examples of it appear everywhere.”40
Moreover, judges have considerable discretion in even ordinary cases.41
According to some proceduralists, the use of discretion to facilitate resolu-
tion “on the merits” is the guiding ethos of the 1938 FRCP.42 In addition to
the many matters that the rules explicitly leave to district courts’ discretion,43
courts have “inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms
with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.”44 And a
court sitting in equity has discretion to shape procedures and remedies if an
adequate remedy is not available at law.45 Courts have invoked these authori-
ties to develop new procedures in complex commercial litigation,46 public
law litigation,47 national security cases,48 and other contexts.49
Even so, MDL is home to an unusual amount of procedural innovation.
In the opioid litigation, for example, Judge Polster announced that he would
not entertain motion practice outside of three “track one” cases designated
for accelerated litigation because he wanted the parties to focus on settle-
ment.50 In ordinary litigation, the entry of such an order would be an aggres-
39 . Id .
40 . Id . at 785.
41 . See, e .g ., Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (2007);
Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561 (2003); see also
Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion over Competing Complex Litigation
Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273, 298 (1991).
42 . See, e .g ., A. Benjamin Spencer, Essay, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 356 (2010); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 922
(1987). District court discretion is also a prominent feature of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
See Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayer’s Triumph, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 2437 (2000).
43 . See Subrin, supra note 42, at 923 n.76 (finding that thirty of the eighty-four Federal
Rules vest discretion in the district judge); cf . Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 528 n.72 (2006) (erroneously stating that Subrin identified twenty-
eight discretion-conferring rules).
44. Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892 (2016).
45 . See generally Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L.
REV. 997, 1004 (2015). As illustrated by the recent debate over the propriety of “national” in-
junctions, the scope of this equitable discretion is contested. See generally Amanda Frost, In
Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065 (2018).
46 . E .g ., In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing
proceedings in six “ ‘focus cases’ out of 310 consolidated class actions, which themselves were
consolidations of thousands of separate class actions”).
47 . See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
48 . See Sinnar, supra note 29.
49 . See Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Tempo-
rary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010 (1997).
50. Case Mgmt. Order No. 1, at 11, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-cv-
2804 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2018), ECF No. 232 (“No party may file any motion not expressly
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sive, and potentially reversible, application of a district judge’s discretion.51
In a mega-MDL, it is all in a day’s work.
B. A Roadmap of MDL Procedure
MDL’s continual innovation makes it impossible to compile an exhaus-
tive catalog of the procedures that it has generated. But the different stages in
the lifecycle of an MDL predictably give rise to certain types of problems that
are addressed through new procedures. For the benefit of those new to MDL,
this Section provides a brief roadmap.
1. The Statutory Framework
MDL takes place under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1407, which was
added to the Code by the Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968.52 The statute
establishes the JPML53 and authorizes it to transfer cases to a district court of
its choosing “for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”54 Trans-
fer proceedings may be initiated by a litigant or the JPML “upon its own ini-
tiative.”55 The standard for transfer echoes the standard under the ordinary
venue transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404: the panel may transfer “civil actions
involving one or more common questions of fact . . . upon its determination
that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and
witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.”56
In contrast to section 1404, the transfer decision is made by the JPML, not
the court where an action was filed.57
In the argot of MDL practitioners, the district court where cases are
transferred is known as the “transferee” or “MDL” court. After the panel
authorized by this Order absent further Order of this Court or express agreement of the par-
ties.”). Judge Polster’s approach to motion practice invites comparisons to Judge Charles
Weiner’s decision not to set cases for trial in the federal asbestos MDL “except in extreme in-
stances where the plaintiff was near death and all [settlement avenues] had been exhausted.”
Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1071 n.127 (1995) (alteration in original) (quoting Transcript of Fair-
ness Hearing at 68–69, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (No.
93-0215)).
51 . See Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1987) (granting
writ of mandamus to reverse district court’s denial of motion where filing of timely motion was
prevented by district court’s demand for pre-motion conference).
52. Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1407 (2012)).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d).
54 . Id . § 1407(a).
55 . Id . § 1407(c).
56 . See id . § 1407(a).
57 . Cf . 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”).
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transfers cases to the transferee court, section 1407 authorizes the transferee
judge to conduct “coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”58 Sec-
tion 1407 does not define the transferee judge’s powers, but courts have held
that “[t]he transferee judge inherits the entire pretrial jurisdiction that the
transferor court could have exercised had the case not been transferred.”59
Thus, the transferee judge can rule on pretrial motions, manage discovery,
appoint masters, hold settlement conferences, enter trial orders, and general-
ly do everything that a district judge does during pretrial. At the conclusion
of pretrial proceedings, “[e]ach action so transferred shall be remanded by
the panel . . . to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have
been previously terminated.”60 In Lexecon Inc . v . Milberg Weiss Bershad
Hynes & Lerach, the Supreme Court concluded that this directive prohibited
the practice of “self-transfer,” in which a transferee court used section 1404
to transfer a case to itself for trial.61
At least in section 1407’s early years, judges and attorneys believed that
much procedural development in MDL would happen through the Manual
for Complex Litigation. A publication of the Federal Judicial Center, the
Manual aims to collect recommendations that, in the words of the first edi-
tion, are “the product of experience and the development of able minds.”62
The first edition appeared in 1969 and was drafted by William H. Becker, a
district judge who, as described below, played a key role in drafting section
1407.63 The second, third, and fourth editions were released in 1985, 1995,
and 2004, respectively.64
Although MDL has been an important form of litigation since Congress
enacted section 1407 in 1968, its importance grew following the enactment
of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.65 That statute liberalized the re-
quirements of federal diversity jurisdiction in certain “class” and “mass” ac-
tions, making it easier for defendants to remove those actions to federal
court.66 Once removed, MDL allows cases to be centralized in a single forum.
58 . Id . § 1407(a).
59. 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3866 (4th
ed. 2013).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
61. 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998).
62. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, at xix (1969).
63 . See In Memoriam: Judge William H . Becker, 807 F. Supp. LXV, LXXII (W.D. Mo.
1992) (quoting Alfred P. Murrah, Foreword, in HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES
FOR THE TRIAL OF PROTRACTED CASES, 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960)) (attributing the first edition to
“Judge Becker’s pen”).
64. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2004); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (THIRD) (1995); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) (1985).
65. Pub. L. No. 109–2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012).
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2. Organizing the Litigation
An initial challenge in a large MDL is to organize the thousands of par-
ties and lawyers whose cases are transferred to a single court. Two decades
ago, Judith Resnik, Denny Curtis, and Deborah Hensler observed that MDL
transferee judges create “ad hoc law firm[s]” through orders that charge law-
yers with coordinating the prosecution or defense of consolidated cases.67
The need for such orders arises from the sheer number of cases and attor-
neys in a mega-MDL. Absent centralized plaintiff’s leadership (and a central-
ized defense in multidefendant cases), hundreds or thousands of individual
parties would engage in simultaneous discovery and motion practice, trans-
forming the litigation into a Babel of conflicting motions, orders, and dis-
covery demands.68
A prototypical case management order appoints a Plaintiffs’ Steering
Committee (PSC) that functions as a board of directors for plaintiffs, lead
counsel who is charged with day-to-day management of the litigation, and
various specialized committees which are charged with tasks like communi-
cating with non-lead counsel, performing discovery, and negotiating settle-
ments.69 Orders are entered under Rule 16, which permits a court to adopt
special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions,
and Rule 42, which permits a court to consolidate actions and “issue any
other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.”70
The court-appointed leadership cannot settle or dismiss non-lead’s cases
without violating well-established limits on nonparty preclusion.71 As one
transferee judge observed, however, leadership nevertheless has “authority to
make any number of decisions that are binding, either literally or effectively,
on all . . . plaintiffs.”72 Appointment orders accomplish this by restricting the
authority of non-lead counsel to engage in ordinary motion practice, take
discovery, and access court resources. For example, orders entered in the
General Motors ignition switch litigation provided that “Lead Counsel was
expected to take the lead in speaking on behalf of all plaintiffs [at confer-
ences] and that, barring permission, [Lead Counsel] would be the only coun-
67. Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the Ag-
gregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 321 (1996); see also Paul
D. Rheingold, The Development of Litigation Groups, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1 (1982).
68 . See In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006, 1013 (5th Cir. 1977).
69 . See In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-md-02804 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2018),
ECF No. 37 (marginal order granting plaintiffs’ renewed motion to approve co-leads, co-
liaisons, and executive committee); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” No.
2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 2010), ECF No. 506 (order appointing plaintiffs’ steer-
ing committee and plaintiffs’ executive committee); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-
md-01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. Aug. 8, 2005), ECF No. 245 (order appointing plaintiffs’ steer-
ing committee).
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(L), 42(a).
71 . See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008).
72 . In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 14-MC-2543 (JMF), 2016 WL
1441804, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2016).
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sel to speak at conferences on behalf of plaintiffs.”73 If non-leadership attor-
neys felt “that Lead Counsel [could not] adequately represent their views,”
they were “invited either to put issues on the agenda for a particular status
conference via Lead Counsel and counsel for Defendants or to submit a let-
ter motion to the Court requesting permission to be heard.”74
The mostly theoretical control that individual plaintiffs exercise over
their own cases means that MDL is not, formally, a species of representative
litigation. As a practical matter, however, appointment orders carve out a
limited exception to the rule against nonparty preclusion. The justification
for that exception is not that, by advocating their clients’ interests, lead
counsel necessarily advances the interests of the “class.”75 Rather, the excep-
tion is justified by the collective action problems that would otherwise make
resolution of an MDL impossible.
As the Fifth Circuit reasoned in an early decision approving the ap-
pointment of lead counsel:
An order consolidating . . . actions during the pre-trial stages, together with
the appointment of a general counsel may in many instances prove the only
effective means of channeling the efforts of counsel along constructive
lines.
. . . .
. . . By making manageable litigation that otherwise would run out of
control they serve interests of the court, the litigants, the other counsel, and
the bar, and of the public at large, who are entitled to their chance at access
to unimpacted courts.76
Consistent with this rationale, appointment orders recognize that plain-
tiffs collected before an MDL court may seek different things from the litiga-
tion.77 Thus, orders aim to “ensur[e] that the PSC represents the broadest
possible swath of claimants or claims,” implicitly adopting a democratic
model of litigating authority.78 Leadership is not authorized to act on behalf
of the plaintiff “class” because consolidated plaintiffs necessarily want the
same thing out of the MDL as leadership’s clients. Rather, leadership’s au-
thority is premised on the practical necessity of coordinating the plaintiffs’
actions. Appointment orders assume that MDL plaintiffs will be better off
73 . Id . at *2.
74 . Id . (first alteration in original).
75 . Cf . FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
76 . In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006, 1014, 1017 (5th Cir. 1977)
(first omission in original) (quoting MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1958)).
77 . See Morris A. Ratner, Class Conflicts, 92 WASH. L. REV. 785, 851 (2017).
78 . Id . See generally Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation:
Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577 (2011); Margaret
H. Lemos, Three Models of Adjudicative Representation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1743 (2017).
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with centralized representation, because leaders will advance the interests of
plaintiffs as a group and the alternative is chaos.79
Leadership appointments are prestigious and lucrative positions.80 Lead-
ership attorneys are compensated for “common benefit” work they perform
on behalf of consolidated plaintiffs through court orders that require non-
lead counsel to contribute a percentage of their contingent fees to a fund that
the court distributes.81
As Resnik, Curtis, and Hensler observe, however, there is little positive
law governing leaders’ selection or compensation.82 Neither section 1407 nor
the Federal Rules address the selection of MDL leadership; often, the court
simply approves a “consensus” slate negotiated by plaintiffs’ counsel.83 No
statute or rule specifically authorizes the court to award leadership common
benefit fees or addresses how such fees should be allocated.84 No statute or
rule defines leadership’s legal relationship with consolidated plaintiffs.85 In
the absence of legislation or rules, elaborate best practices evolved surround-
ing each of these subjects. For example, in the Volkswagen clean diesel litiga-
tion, Judge Charles Breyer entered a sixteen-page protocol governing
matters such as bookkeeping, compensable work, and compensation for the
use of attorneys’ private jets.86
Even when control of the litigation is centralized in a PSC and lead
counsel, docketing and organizing cases may involve serious logistical prob-
lems. To streamline filing, courts and attorneys invented the practice of “di-
rect filing,” which allows a plaintiff to file directly in the MDL court rather
than having a case transferred there by the JPML.87 To manage the variety of
claims asserted in MDL, courts have ordered the filing of a “master com-
plaint” or “master administrative complaint.”88 Where a single complaint
79 . See Ratner, supra note 77, at 851.
80 . See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidis-
trict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1526 (2017).
81 . See Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV.
371 (2014).
82 . See Resnik et al., supra note 67, at 326–36.
83 . See Burch & Williams, supra note 80, at 1460.
84 . See Fallon, supra note 81, at 376 (“The theoretical bases for the application of the
common fund concept to MDLs are the same as for class actions—namely, equity and her
blood brother, quantum meriut.”).
85. Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict Liti-
gations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1988 (2011).
86 . In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
3:15-md-02672-CRB, at 8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2016), ECF No. 1254 (order establishing protocol
for common benefit work, noting “[p]rivate or charter travel will not be reimbursed except in
unusual circumstances, as approved by Lead Counsel”).
87. Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in Multidis-
trict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 796–97 (2012).
88 . See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1069,
1076–77 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (“Master Complaint . . . combines dozens of class action complaints
involving Firestone tires that were filed in or removed to federal district courts throughout the
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cannot accommodate all of the plaintiffs’ claims, courts have used “pleading
bundles”—essentially, master complaints for different types of parties or
claims. In the Deepwater Horizon MDL, lead counsel proposed establishing
different master complaints for different types of claims plaintiffs asserted
against BP, Transocean, and Halliburton.89 After the district court approved
the idea in principle, counsel devised specific pleading bundles. The court
“so ordered” the bundles, and the clerk’s office modified its electronic filing
system so that plaintiffs could “join” a pleading bundle by filing a short-form
complaint drafted by lead plaintiff’s counsel.90
3. Managing the Litigation
MDL’s ad hockery continues in the pretrial stage. Here, the need for new
procedure arises from the desire to move the litigation into a posture in
which it can be resolved.91 Contrary to conventional wisdom,92 however, the
endgame of MDL is not necessarily settlement. Douglas Smith details a vari-
ety of procedures that courts have invented to screen and cull cases.93 They
include plaintiff and defendant fact sheets, “show cause” orders that require
parties to define claims or show they are nonfrivolous, Lone Pine orders that
require proof of facts crucial to plaintiffs’ claims, and assisted review using
magistrate judges and special masters.94 Judges have used a range of devices,
from special committees to anti-suit injunctions, to “coordinate” related
state-court litigation.95 In the late 1990s, courts devised the concept of “bell-
wether trials” to create settlement pressure where cases remained pending
after discovery and culling.96 More recently, transferee judges borrowed the
country and transferred to this MDL proceeding.”), rev’d sub nom. In re Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002).
89 . See Transcript of Status Conference Proceedings at 11, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
“Deepwater Horizon,” No. 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2010), ECF No. 550.
90. The “A” pleading bundle included claims for personal injury and death. The “B”
bundle included 4 sub-categories including “Private Individuals and Business Loss Claims.”
The “C” bundle included “Public Damage Claims.” Lastly, the “D” bundle included “Injunctive
and Regulatory Claims.” In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” No. 2:10-md-
02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2010), ECF No. 569 (first case management order).
91 . See Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class
Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2219 (2008) (stating that the “very function” of
MDL “is to coordinate and resolve multistate litigation”).
92 . See, e .g ., D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2175, 2176 (2017).
93. Douglas G. Smith, The Myth of Settlement in MDL Proceedings, 106 KY. L.J. (forth-
coming 2019).
94 . Id . (manuscript at 7–21) (on file with the Michigan Law Review); see Nora Freeman
Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2019).
95 . See Margaret S. Thomas, Morphing Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Set-
tlements, 63 EMORY L.J. 1339 (2014).
96. Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 577–78, 583–85
(2008); see Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2323, 2325, 2331 (2008).
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concept of “science days” from patent litigation to get an early handle on the
scientific issues in products liability MDLs.97 In rare cases, transferee judges
fed up with the lack of progress toward resolution have remanded cases to
transferor courts for trial or threatened to do so.98
A striking feature of MDL practice is its lack of a fixed order of battle.
Federal civil litigation typically proceeds in a predictable order, with motion
practice leading to discovery, summary judgment, Daubert motions, and, in
rare cases that survive without settling or being dismissed, trial.99 In the
mega-MDLs that are this Article’s focus, this order of battle is often discard-
ed. Courts separate litigation into tracks,100 stay discovery in order to focus
litigation on particular cases or issues,101 or limit proceedings to issues such
as general causation that hold the potential to make or break many cases at
once.102 The common thread running through these orders is that they ad-
dress the needs of specific cases. As judges in Gluck’s survey emphasized,
“every MDL is different.”103
97 . See, e .g ., Order Regarding Science Day and MDL Website, In re Abilify (Aripipra-
zole) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:16-md-2734 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2016), ECF No. 142; see also
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 12.34 (2004).
98 . See, e .g ., In re Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-MD-
2391 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 6, 2018) (order transferring proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) and
explaining the transfer to receiving courts); Nicholas Malfitano, Federal Judge Rules 1,200
Xarelto Lawsuits Will Be Removed from MDL for Disposition in Separate Trials, PA. RECORD
(Mar. 13, 2018), https://pennrecord.com/stories/511360626-federal-judge-rules-1-200-xarelto-
lawsuits-will-be-removed-from-mdl-for-disposition-in-separate-trials [https://perma.cc
/6GFM-LCZS].
99. This statement is based on the author’s experience as a clerk in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York and conversations with federal judges and attor-
neys whose practice focuses on civil litigation in federal court. There are few studies that sys-
tematically examine the progress of federal civil litigation. However, the hypothesis that cases
proceed in a regular order is consistent with findings in Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual
Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil
Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175 (2010). That study coded for six mutually
exclusive outcomes—(1) dismissal, (2) early settlement, (3) summary judgment loss for plain-
tiff, (4) late settlement, (5) trial win for plaintiff, and (6) trial loss for plaintiff—and found a
drop-off of cases at each stage. See id . at 185–87. But see Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural De-
sign, 71 VAND. L. REV. 821, 823 (2018) (arguing on the basis of “appellate opinions in a variety
of procedural areas” that “the textbook order is not an accurate description of civil procedure
in the federal courts”).
100 . E .g ., Emily Field, 2nd Bellwether Track Set in Opioid MDL, LAW360 (Jan. 2, 2019,
5:13 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1114551/2nd-bellwether-track-set-in-opioid-mdl
(on file with the Michigan Law Review).
101 . See, e .g ., Erin Marie Daly, Judge Lifts Discovery Stay in Qwest MDL, LAW360 (Aug.
15, 2007, 12:00 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/32551/judge-lifts-discovery-stay-in-
qwest-mdl (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
102 . See, e .g ., Sara Randazzo, In Roundup Case, the Science Will Go on Trial First, WALL
STREET J. (Feb. 15, 2019, 10:58 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-roundup-case-the-
science-will-go-on-trial-first-11550246311 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
103. Gluck, supra note 8, at 1689.
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4. Resolution
The aggregate settlements that many MDLs culminate in are another site
of procedural innovation. The prototypical settlement resolves all the cases
collected before a transferee judge by establishing a special-purpose claims
facility to process claims according to streamlined procedures negotiated by
the defendant and plaintiff’s leadership.104 These claims facilities are their
own ad hoc institutions. The claims program established in the Deepwater
Horizon MDL consisted of “the Court-appointed Claims Administrator, Pat-
rick Juneau, and his staff of 25 people, who in turn employ five Claims Ven-
dors employing more than 3,200 people working in locations throughout the
country.”105 The group had headquarters in Louisiana and nineteen “Claims
Assistance Centers” throughout the Gulf Coast region.106
Any settlement must pull in parties, screen and evaluate claims, and pro-
tect settling defendants against future litigation.107 As Elizabeth Burch shows,
provisions that perform these functions migrate from MDL to MDL as the
state of the art evolves.108 An example is the “inventory settlement” provi-
sions that appeared in the early 2000s. After the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Amchem and Ortiz appeared to bar the use of settlement classes to resolve
mass torts,109 attorneys devised contractual provisions that had much the
same effect. Described by their authors as a “remarkable approach to resolu-
tion of ‘mass tort’ litigation” that “promise[d] to become the template for
similar resolution of future litigations of this kind,” the provisions required
attorneys to recommend a settlement to their entire client base.110 After first
being used in the Propulsid MDL, they reappeared in the Vioxx, Fosamax,
and Yasmin/Yaz MDLs.111 More recently, MDL catalyzed the reemergence of
104 . See, e .g ., In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 796 (5th Cir. 2014); In re Vioxx
Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 559 (E.D. La. 2009).
105 . In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 904 (E.D.
La. 2012) (footnote omitted), aff’d sub nom . In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790.
106 . Id .
107 . See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV.
659, 690–94 (1989).
108. Burch, supra note 10, at 92 tbl.1.
109 . See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999) (stating it was “obvious after
Amchem that a class divided between holders of present and future claims . . . requires division
into homogeneous subclasses”); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)
(stating that some Rule 23 requirements “demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the
settlement context”); id . at 627 (requiring that a “global compromise” include “structural as-
surance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals affected”);
see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475,
1475 (2005).
110. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Steering Comm.’s Motion for Award of At-
torney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Costs at 1, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-
md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. May 3, 2005), ECF No. 1752.
111. Burch, supra note 10, at 98–99, 101.
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settlement class actions that Amchem and Ortiz appeared to bar.112 Reason-
ing that mega-MDLs provide structural guarantees of fairness missing in
Amchem and Ortiz, courts approved class settlements notwithstanding con-
flicts of interests that those cases suggested could only be addressed through
subclassing.113
Again, one must be careful not to overstate MDL’s uniqueness. The con-
tractual nature of settlement means that it always provides an opportunity to
devise creative solutions that a court following the strictures of the law could
not impose.114 Furthermore, scholars have shown that the major develop-
ments in the lifecycle of an MDL—aggregation of related claims, transfer of
control to sophisticated bargaining agents, and mass resolution through
grids or algorithms that resolve claims through factors shown to drive ver-
dicts and settlements—occur whenever the market generates large numbers
of factually related claims.115 In this sense, MDL structures underlying mar-
ket dynamics, rather than creating the conditions for settlement from
scratch.
All the same, MDL has been remarkably successful at catalyzing innova-
tive settlements. A “Who’s Who” of the largest and most innovative settle-
ments devised over the past decade would be crowded with settlements
negotiated in an MDL.116 Indeed, it would probably contain nothing but.
C. The Structural Environment for MDL Procedure-Making
Before turning to the debate over MDL’s legality, three overarching fea-
tures of MDL procedure-making deserve mention. First, procedure-making
in MDL is bottom-up, not top-down. As Burch, Gluck, and Margie Williams
show, the central players in the design of MDL procedure are transferee
judges and “repeat player” lawyers who have built specialized MDL practic-
es.117 Like Daniel Plainview’s character in There Will Be Blood, lawyers travel
from case to case, bringing procedures they created in prior MDLs with
112 . See Ratner, supra note 77; Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel Issacharoff, The Participa-
tory Class Action, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846 (2017).
113 . See Ratner, supra note 77, at 827–28 (discussing the Deepwater Horizon, NFL con-
cussion, and pet food products settlements).
114 . See generally Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn’t Everything: The Lawyer
as Problem Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 916 (2000).
115 . E .g ., Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settle-
ment: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004); Deborah
R. Hensler, The Real World of Tort Litigation, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES
155 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998); Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding
Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 1050 (1993).
116. For an initial effort to create such a database, see Aggregate Litigation Data Project,
CTR. ON CIV. JUST., NYU SCH. L., http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/civiljustice/projects
[https://perma.cc/K3G7-H5JU].
117. Burch & Williams, supra note 80, at 1475–87; Gluck, supra note 8, at 1701.
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them to new litigations.118 Even modest efforts to impose hierarchical con-
trol on MDL procedure trail the state of the art by years.119
Second, many decisions in MDL are effectively immune from appellate
review. The reason is that MDL inherits the procedural apparatus of ordi-
nary litigation, including the final judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.120 That
section generally requires that a party await final judgment before taking an
appeal. Thus, a party that objects to, say, the appointment of lead counsel or
use of pleading bundles must wait until judgment is entered to appeal the
relevant orders. During that time, the litigation may settle, presenting the
party with a choice between quickly resolving the case under the settlement
or appealing the objectionable order. If the MDL does not result in a settle-
ment, years may elapse before final judgment is entered.121
These two features might suggest that procedure-making in MDL is to-
tally unrestrained. In fact, a review of transcripts from major MDLs shows
many situations in which lead counsel and transferee judges were attentive
to the limits of their authority under the Federal Rules and the governing
substantive law.122 The reason is that plaintiff’s leadership, defendant’s lead-
ership, the transferee judge, and potentially others hold an effective veto
power over the use of new procedures and the progress of the litigation gen-
erally. This, however, introduces a selection effect: the errors most likely to
draw an objection are those that exceed the transferee court’s authority and
118 . See, e .g ., Transcript of Discovery Conference at 28–29, In re Nat’l Prescription Opi-
ate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio May 11, 2018), ECF No. 416 (“MR.
BUCHANAN: . . . I have a stack of order after order in the last two or three years in major
pieces of litigation with many thousands of cases . . . involving Johnson & Johnson,
Volkswagen . . . .”); Transcript of Status Conference Proceedings, supra note 89, at 51 (“MR
ROY: . . . We’re going to come back with a proposal that largely mirrors what Judge Fallon has
done in Vioxx. THE COURT: Yes, because that’s definitely what I want to do.”).
119 . See DUKE LAW SCH. CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, MDL STANDARDS AND BEST
PRACTICES (2014); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2004).
120 . See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292(a)–(b) (2012) (generally limiting interlocutory appeals
to orders entering or refusing to enter injunctions and appeals certified for interlocutory re-
view).
121. The Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Gelboim v . Bank of America Corp ., 135 S. Ct.
897 (2015), marginally increased MDL’s exposure to appellate review in holding that an appeal
could be taken from a Rule 54(b) order dismissing some of the claims consolidated in an MDL.
But Gelboim appeals may only be taken from orders of dismissal, and not the crucial interlocu-
tory decisions governing the organization, management, and settlement of an MDL.
122. Transcript of Status Conference Proceedings at 9, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate
Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 2018) ECF No. 854 (“Plaintiffs would love
to cabin discovery to what they decide is relevant with respect to how they choose to prove
their case, but they cannot deprive us of our right to defend ourselves, and we have the right
under the rules to take discovery that’s relevant to those defenses.”); Transcript of Teleconfer-
ence Proceedings at 29, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D.
Ohio June 6, 2018) ECF No. 613 (“I don’t think I could have prevented motions—anyone from
filing a motion.”); Transcript of Status Conference at 8, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
2:05-md-01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. Jan. 18, 2008) (“[A]ny plaintiff attorney who feels that he
or she is entitled to receive some common benefit funds, they have the right to petition the
Court for that.”).
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injure the interests of a player with power to veto the new procedure. If an
unlawful procedure does not harm a player with veto power, it is likely to go
unchecked.
In light of these dynamics, MDL procedure-making involves a high de-
gree of collaboration among case leadership. Again and again in the tran-
scripts, counsel would raise a procedural problem with the transferee judge
only to be instructed to meet and confer or work something out.123 When
counsel returned to the court, the judge adopted their proposal for the entire
MDL.124
On the whole, this environment makes MDL procedure-making fast,
collaborative, and responsive to the needs of particular cases. One judge
comments: “It’s problem solving together.”125
II. MDL AND THE RULE OF LAW
MDL is a world of ad hoc procedure. This very flexibility, however, leads
to charges that its approach to aggregate litigation violates the rule of law.
This Part introduces the debate surrounding those charges.
This Part first introduces the conception of the rule of law that attacks
on MDL implicitly draw upon. It then summarizes arguments that MDL vio-
lates the rule of law and shows that the attack on MDL approaches it as a
form of litigation that is governed by rule-of-law norms associated with or-
dinary civil litigation. As Part III argues, that assumption is incorrect.
123 . See, e .g ., Transcript of Status Conference at 16, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig.,
No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio May 14, 2018), ECF No. 418 (“You’ve been working co-
operatively. Just continue to do that.”); Transcript of Status Conference Proceedings, supra
note 89, at 38 (“I want liaison counsel, in consulting with other interested parties, to go back
and meet and confer within the next week to ten days and report back to the Court to continue
to see if you can work out some of these issues relating to timing and scope of discovery be-
cause that’s where it seems to be where the main rub is going to be right now.”); Transcript of
Status Conference Proceedings at 60, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” No.
2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2011), ECF No. 1508 (“I think it’s absolutely neces-
sary that everyone cooperate with each other, continue to be civil with each other, and, to the
extent problems arise, which I know they will from time to time, meet and confer, and then if
you can’t solve them yourself, bring them to my attention.”); Transcript of Status Conference
at 47, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-md-01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. June 27, 2008) (“I
do feel that the parties do better working this out non-judicially than allowing me to work it
out because it will destroy this opportunity and make life more complicated for everybody.”).
124 . See, e .g ., Transcript of Teleconference Proceedings at 12, In re Nat’l Prescription
Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 2018), ECF No. 854 (“If I get no
objections, I am going to adopt those proposals.”); Transcript of Status Conference Proceed-
ings, supra note 123, at 34 (“Hearing no objection, I will sign that order today, okay?”); Tran-
script of Status Conference at 18, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-md-01657-EEF-DEK
(E.D. La. June 23, 2005) (“I put some handwritten notes on this form and I will simply adopt it
in an order and give you my thinking on that particular form.”).
125. Gluck, supra note 8, at 1700–01.
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A. The Rule of Law as Regular Procedure
Because the “rule of law” means many things,126 saying that MDL “vio-
lates the rule of law” is vacuous if the argument is not specified further. The
specific strand of rule-of-law thinking that MDL critics draw upon identifies
the rule of law with regular procedure—particularly, the kind of procedures
used by courts. In American jurisprudence, perhaps the most famous pro-
ponent of this view is Lon Fuller.127
In The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, Fuller set out to describe “the
optimum and essential conditions for the functioning of adjudication.”128
Fuller’s project was to identify the features that distinguished adjudication
from other forms of legal ordering (e.g., contract). Drawing on midcentury
analytic philosophy and informal observations of adjudicators, Fuller argued
that adjudication aims to provide “an authoritative determination of ques-
tions raised by claims of right and accusations of guilt.”129 To accomplish
this, Fuller argued, adjudication necessarily involves the “[p]resentation of
proofs and reasoned argument.”130 As discussed below, Fuller did not believe
that all matters of social life must be resolved via adjudication.131 But he
claimed that, where an issue is to be resolved through adjudication, the rule
of law demands procedures that guarantee parties the opportunity to present
evidence and argument.132 Thus, Fuller and those following in his tradition
insist on procedures such as adversary presentation of proof and argument,
the right to be present at crucial stages in the proceedings, an impartial and
properly qualified judge, and a right of appeal to an impartial tribunal.133 Ab-
126 . See Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Flori-
da)?, 21 LAW & PHIL. 137, 140–45 (2002).
127. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364
(1978). This posthumously published article was based on a working paper that Fuller used as
the basis for lectures and courses at Harvard Law School, see id . at 353, and was part of a
broader Legal Process discourse that claimed to identify the appropriate functions of different
parts of the federal government, see generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). For earlier works that anticipated Fuller’s account
in some respects, see A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION (10th ed. 1959), and F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 112 (definitive ed.
2007). The desirability of regular procedure is also a theme of Justice Scalia’s critique of discre-
tionary standards. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989). In it, he derided “[t]he common-law, discretion-conferring approach” as violative
of our “fundamental sense of justice,” the realities of the Supreme Court’s limited docket, and
the proper role of a federal appellate judge. Id . at 1178.
128. Fuller, supra note 127, at 364.
129 . Id . at 368.
130 . Id . at 363.
131 . See infra notes 318–320 and accompanying text.
132. Fuller, supra note 127, at 363.
133 . Id . at 381–91; Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY § 5.2 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-
law/#ProcAspe [https://perma.cc/NG5W-N8DV] (stating that the procedural aspect of rule of
December 2019] MDL as Public Administration 425
sent such procedures, we might have the application of legal authority, but
we do not have “adjudication.”
As Jeremy Waldron observes, Fuller’s procedural principles are central
to “the ordinary person’s conception of the Rule of Law.”134 Indeed, if one
distinguishes between sociological legitimacy, on the one hand, and legal and
moral legitimacy, on the other, Fullerian procedure might seem essential to
the legitimacy of state action.135 Legitimacy in the sociological sense asks
whether the relevant actors regard state action “as justified, appropriate, or
otherwise deserving of support for reasons beyond fear of sanctions or mere
hope for personal reward.”136 A large body of research shows a strong con-
nection between perceived procedural fairness and people’s willingness to
accept decisions, whether or not they win.137
B. The Attack on MDL
MDL’s ad hockery is difficult to reconcile with this conception of the
rule of law. As Part I described, MDL procedure evolves in response to prob-
lems that arise in particular cases instead of following a standard rulebook.
While MDL formally respects the individuality of consolidated cases, control
of plaintiffs’ cases is exercised by lead attorneys who make crucial decisions
on behalf of the plaintiff “class.” MDL transferee judges are archetypal
“managerial judges,” appointing the lawyers who prosecute cases on behalf
of consolidated plaintiffs, directing the order of business, and pushing overt-
ly and subtly for settlement.138 Plaintiffs whose cases are swept into MDL
have little opportunity to present evidence or argument until the litigation is
settled. And many decisions are immune from appellate review.
Thus, it is not surprising that as MDL’s importance grew, critics trained
their sights on its lack of regular procedures. Martin Redish and Julie Karaba
law entails “a hearing by an impartial and independent tribunal that is required to administer
existing legal norms on the basis of the formal presentation of evidence and argument; a right
to representation by counsel at such a hearing; a right to be present, to confront and question
witnesses, and to make legal argument about the bearing of the evidence and the various legal
norms relevant to the case; and a right to hear reasons from the tribunal when it reaches its
decision, which are responsive to the evidence and arguments presented before it.” (cleaned
up)).
134. Waldron, supra note 133, § 5.2; see also PAUL GOWDER, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE
REAL WORLD 4 (2016) (noting that the weak version of rule of law requires that coercive power
“be used under rules that give those over whom that power is exercised the opportunity to call
the users of the power to account on the basis of reasons”).
135 . See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1787 (2005).
136 . Id . at 1795.
137 . See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE ch. 4 (1988).
138 . See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); Tobias
Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 1030
(2013).
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describe MDL as a “procedural no-man’s land”139 that “involves something
of a cross between the Wild West, twentieth-century political smoke-filled
rooms, and the Godfather movies.”140 Linda Mullenix contends that the law-
yers and judges who control MDL “manipulat[e] . . . procedure to accom-
plish ends the mechanism was never intended to perform.”141
Curiously, critics disagree over who is harmed by MDL’s flexibility. One
line of criticism focuses on plaintiffs swept into an MDL.142 Drawing on the
parallels between MDL and class action litigation, critics argue that MDL is
beset by the same agency problems that are thought to beset class action liti-
gation.143 The appointment of MDL leadership separates control of claims
from their owners. Acting for their own interests instead of the parties they
serve, leadership negotiates settlements that deliver little compensation to
plaintiffs and large common benefit fees to lead counsel and members of the
PSC. No institution currently collects data that allows these claims to be
evaluated on a systematic basis. But scholars point to cases such as the Pro-
pulsid litigation as proof that MDL leads to collusive settlements. There, 37
of 6,012 (.6 percent) of plaintiffs recovered money through an aggregate set-
tlement negotiated by MDL leadership, who recovered more than $27 mil-
lion in fees.144
If MDL consistently harmed plaintiffs, one might expect corporate de-
fendants to support it. But while corporate defendants historically made
heavy use of MDL,145 times have changed. In recent Congresses, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce has supported legislation that would require MDL
139. Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litiga-
tion, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 142 (2015)
(quoting Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations,
91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 95 (2011)).
140 . Id . at 111.
141. Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolu-
tion, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 553 (2013).
142 . See, e .g ., Bradt & Rave, supra note 30, at 1264; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers
as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273 (2012); Burch, supra note 10;
Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District
Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 120 (2010).
143 . See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Bal-
ancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987); Bruce
Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality
and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2000); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991). For a somewhat overstated critique
of the literature’s focus on agency costs, which contends that regulatory regimes enforced
through class action litigation focus exclusively on deterrence, see Myriam Gilles & Gary B.
Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial
Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2006).
144. Burch, supra note 10, at 127–28 (“[O]nly 0.6 percent of claimants recovered money,
totaling little more than $6.5 million. Yet, leaders collected over $27 million in fees.” (footnote
omitted)).
145 . See Delaventura v. Columbia Acorn Tr., 417 F. Supp. 2d 147 (D. Mass. 2006).
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plaintiffs to submit evidentiary support for covered claims shortly after they
are transferred to the MDL court, prohibit bellwether trials, and allow inter-
locutory appeals of orders entered by the transferee judge.146 In 2018, a de-
fense interest group called Lawyers for Civil Justice (LCJ) launched a project
entitled “Rules 4 MDLs” to lobby for “clear, uniform rules that apply in MDL
cases.”147
LCJ mobilized support for 2015 amendments to Rule 26 that restricted
discovery in federal civil litigation.148 The premise of its new project—backed
by advertisements, a social media campaign, and its own hashtag
(#Rules4MDLs)—is that MDL courts’ refusal to follow a regular playbook
subjects defendants to unfair settlement pressure.149 In August 2017, LCJ
proposed seven MDL-specific amendments to the FRCP.150 In September
2018, the group offered six revised proposals—governing matters such as
master complaints, permissive joinder, and third-party litigation funding
agreements—for discussion with the new MDL Subcommittee of the Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Rules.151 The proposals explicitly aim to prevent the
146. Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency
Act of 2017, H.R. 985 § 105, 115th Cong. (2017).
147. RULES 4 MDLS, supra note 18.
148. LCJ’s membership brochure boasts that the group “has overcome the serious re-
sistance of the trial lawyers to achieve important reforms” including “the 2015 amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishing a new ‘proportionality’ standard for the scope
of discovery and a uniform rule governing sanctions for loss of ESI . . . . For these and other
achievements, LCJ has been honored by the U.S. Chamber’s Institute for Legal Reform.”
LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, SHAPE THE FUTURE OF LITIGATION (2017), http://
www.lfcj.com/uploads/1/1/2/0/112061707/membershipbrochure_10x19_october_2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SCD7-RGUH].
149 . See @Rules4MDLs, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/rules4mdls?lang=en [https://
perma.cc/DYJ7-XPFA].
150. They were: (1) require each plaintiff to file an individual complaint; (2) require indi-
vidual claims to be pled with particularity under Rule 9(b); (3) create a new Rule 12(b)(8) mo-
tion “for individual claims in MDL cases that lack meaningful evidence of a valid claim”; (4)
eliminate permissive claim joinder for certain plaintiffs; (5) require “plaintiffs in MDL cases to
produce meaningful evidence in support of their claims, and to disclose the existence of third-
party financing arrangements and the use of lead generators”; (6) establish “a confidential con-
sent procedure without which bellwether trials in consolidated trials cannot occur”; and (7)
allow interlocutory appeals of “critical rulings in MDL cases.” LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
REQUEST FOR RULEMAKING, supra note 12.
151. The revised proposals are: (1) a “Multidistrict Litigation Disclosure” amendment to
Rule 26(a) “requiring disclosure of evidence showing the cause and nature of the injury al-
leged”; (2) a new rule allowing “an appeal from an order granting or denying a motion under
Rule 12(b)(2) or Rule 56 in the course of coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings
conducted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b), provided that the outcome of such appeal may be
dispositive of claims in [50] or more actions in the coordinated or consolidated pretrial pro-
ceedings”; (3) a prohibition of bellwether trials, unless the parties consent; (4) mandatory dis-
closure to opposing counsel of third-party litigation funding agreements; (5) a prohibition on
permissive joinder of plaintiffs under Rule 20; and (6) new rules “defin[ing] the documents
used as pleadings in MDL cases.” LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, MDL PRACTICES, supra note 12
(alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
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experimentation and case-by-case procedural development described above.
In LCJ’s words, “the ad hoc use of mechanisms such as fact sheets and Lone
Pine orders varies wildly and is inherently inconsistent with the fundamental
idea of the FRCP that procedures should be uniform, clear and accessible.”152
C. MDL as Super-Sized Litigation
A striking feature of the attack on MDL is the assumption that it is
simply a larger version of the litigation that takes place every day in federal
district courts. LCJ, for example, argues that “[w]ith so much of the pending
federal civil caseload consolidated into MDL cases, the [Federal Rules]
should be modernized with clear, uniform rules that apply in MDL cases,
benefiting all stakeholders by providing the same fairness, clarity and cer-
tainty that the [Federal Rules] ensure for all other civil cases.”153 Even oppo-
nents of LCJ’s proposals do not challenge the assumption that MDL is mere
litigation. For example, the plaintiff’s bar through the American Association
for Justice argues, “Judges need to remain empowered to exercise broad dis-
cretion in any particular case rather than be constrained by formalistic pre-
conceptions of what a vocal minority consider to be ‘best practices.’ ”154
It is not difficult to understand why parties view MDL this way. Section
1407 appears in the venue chapter of the Judicial Code, alongside provisions
on interpleader, suits against the United States, and related matters.155 Sec-
tion 1407 speaks the language of litigation, referring to the “transfer” of “civil
actions involving one or more common questions of fact” to a single district
court for “coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”156 The institu-
tion charged with moving cases from district courts for coordinated pretrial
proceedings—the JPML—is located within the federal judiciary.157 The actor
charged with managing the consolidated proceedings is an Article III judge.
Even the title of section 1407—“Multidistrict litigation”—describes it as,
well, litigation.158
152 . Id . at 3.
153. RULES 4 MDLS, supra note 18 (emphasis added).
154. Bradt, supra note 13, at 99 (quoting Memorandum from Am. Ass’n of Justice’s MDL
Working Grp. to Judge Robert Dow and Members of the MDL Subcomm. (Feb. 22, 2018), in
AGENDA: MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, APRIL 10, 2018, at 205, 205
(2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04-civil-rules-agenda-book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DYS8-DF24]).
155. 28 U.S.C. pt. IV, ch. 87 (2012).
156 . Id . § 1407(a).
157 . See id . § 1407(c)–(d).
158 . Id . § 1407. The official title of the Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-296, 82 Stat. 109, simply restates the act’s functions. See id . (“An Act to provide for the tem-
porary transfer to a single district for coordinated retrial proceedings of civil actions pending
in different districts which involve one or more common questions of fact, and for other pur-
poses.”).
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As the next Part argues, however, MDL is not simply a super-sized ver-
sion of the litigation that takes place every day in federal district courts. Ra-
ther, the structure of the MDL statute and the way that MDL functions
borrow from programs such as Social Security, where an agency is charged
with resolving a huge number of claims within parameters specified by law.
Reconceiving MDL as a form of public administration clarifies what section
1407 does when it authorizes the JPML to consolidate cases before a single
district judge for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Equally
important, it suggests a new perspective on the debate over MDL and rule of
law. If MDL is a form of a public administration, it is properly evaluated
through the distinctive rule-of-law norms that evolved with the growth of
the U.S. administrative state.
III. MDL AS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
As the prior Parts explained, procedural innovation is at the heart of
claims that MDL violates the rule of law. Civil litigation in federal district
courts prototypically follows a predictable order of battle established by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By contrast, MDL depends on centralized
management, case-specific solutions, and ad hoc procedure to resolve cases.
This ad hockery and the massive settlements it facilitates prompt charges
that MDL is a lawless Wild West.
To evaluate these charges, however, one needs a better understanding of
what MDL is. Criticisms of MDL’s flexibility draw on a textbook picture of
adjudication, which equates due process with adherence to fair rules of the
road that are defined in advance of specific disputes. This understanding
captures deeply held intuitions about the separation of powers and the ap-
propriate role of courts and judges. Viewed from this vantage point, MDL’s
ad hockery is indeed a problem. All concede that the mega-cases that critics
focus on are not resolved through an evenhanded application of procedures
defined in advance of disputes. In MDL, the judge is no umpire.
As this Part argues, however, the image of MDL as a form of litigation
governed by the textbook understanding of due process is mistaken. When
analyzing novel institutions, one should consider, among other factors, the
problem that motivated Congress to act, the structural choices reflected in the
statute that it enacted, and the manner that the statute functions.159 Applied
to MDL, this approach shows that section 1407 is best understood as a hy-
brid form of public administration that mixes procedures of ordinary civil
litigation, on one hand, with structural features and tools of public admin-
istration, on the other.
159 . See, e .g ., FARHANG, supra note 31; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2007); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic
Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267, 314–18 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson
eds., 1989). See generally Jeb Barnes, Bringing the Courts Back In: Interbranch Perspectives on
the Role of Courts in American Politics and Policy Making, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 25 (2007).
430 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:403
What does it mean to say that MDL is a “hybrid form of public admin-
istration”? The claim is not that section 1407 literally created a freestanding
administrative agency. The MDL system operates within the federal judiciary
and is administered by Article III judges. Moreover, Article III would bar
Congress from creating an administrative agency to do the work of MDL if it
tried to do so. Rather, the claim is that MDL uses tools familiar from admin-
istrative programs (delegation, centralization, and empowered, expert
agents) to address a problem (Congress’s procedural myopia) that Congress
often confronts when it creates an administrative program.
The specific administrative programs that MDL resembles most closely
require an agency to adjudicate a high volume of claims. When creating
those agencies, Congress anticipated a flood of claims but did not know what
procedures would be necessary to address them—the very problem Congress
confronted in section 1407. In both settings, Congress overcame its own ig-
norance by delegating to an institution that would act with better infor-
mation, and was subject to fewer constraints, than Congress itself. In both
contexts, the delegate used this authority to develop procedures to address
procedural problems as they arose.
An accurate institutional understanding of MDL matters for at least two
reasons. The first is that, in a system of separated powers, the demands of the
rule of law depend on the kind of institution exercising state power. For ex-
ample, Congress may appropriate money; the president may not.160 Relevant
here, a distinctive understanding of the administrative rule of law emerged
in the decades following World War II as the scope of the federal adminis-
trative state expanded. Responding to criticisms remarkably similar to those
leveled against contemporary MDL, policymakers rejected the idea that
agencies must follow regular procedures to satisfy the rule of law. But if
agencies were free to develop new procedures, alternative arrangements were
needed to ensure that agencies did not act arbitrarily and stayed within the
limits of their statutory authority. The settlement that emerged—reflected in
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and precedent interpreting it—was
to guarantee the transparency of administrative action and the right to par-
ticipate in the development of administrative policy, while providing liberal
opportunities for judicial review. Viewed from this perspective, MDL’s pro-
cedural flexibility is entirely ordinary, even to be expected.
The second reason an accurate understanding of MDL matters is that it
has implications for reforms to enhance MDL’s legitimacy. If MDL’s proce-
dural flexibility is not a cause for concern, it lacks guarantees of accessibility,
transparency, and reasoned decisionmaking that underpin the legitimacy of
the modern administrative state. The history of federal administration teach-
es that these governance deficits, not MDL’s reliance on ad hoc procedure,
pose the greatest threat to its legitimacy.
This Part explains why MDL is appropriately viewed as a hybrid form of
public administration and outlines the implications of that point for claims
160 . See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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that MDL violates the rule of law. Having shown that MDL is appropriately
viewed as a form of public administration, the next Part turns to proposals
that would improve the transparency and accountability of the MDL pro-
cess.
A. The Problem for Congress
MDL’s similarity to public administration begins with the problem that
motivated Congress to act.161 As is familiar, the Multidistrict Litigation Act
was a response to the electrical equipment litigation, described by one partic-
ipant as “the greatest challenge to the administration of civil justice in the
history of the federal judicial system.”162 In 1960, the Justice Department in-
dicted “virtually every significant American manufacturer of electrical
equipment” for a conspiracy to fix prices and divide territory.163 According
to the indictments, the conspiracy affected $6 to 7 billion in total sales.164 In
February 1961, the criminal cases were resolved through plea agreements
that subjected the defendants to modest penalties.165
The pleas were only the beginning of the legal response to the scandal,
however. On their heels, utilities and other companies that had purchased
electrical equipment at inflated prices filed more than 1,800 treble damages
actions.166 The litigation was spread throughout the United States but con-
centrated in major cities.167 Thomas Clary, the Chief Judge of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, estimated that plaintiffs in the 1,800-plus cases as-
serted some 25,632 claims.168
Those cases could not be resolved through ordinary civil procedure.
With litigation pending in thirty-five districts,169 some mechanism was
needed to prevent courts from issuing conflicting orders and to keep the dis-
covery process from generating staggering transaction costs. In February
1962, Chief Justice Earl Warren formed an ad hoc subcommittee of the
161. This account largely follows Andrew Bradt’s pathbreaking archival research on the
origins of section 1407. See Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation
Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831 (2017) [hereinafter Bradt, Radical Proposal]; Bradt, supra
note 13; Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More: MDL’s Roots as a Class Action
Alternative, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1711 (2017); see also Resnik, supra note 30, at 29–35.
162. William H. Becker, Modern Discovery: Promoting Efficient Use and Preventing Abuse
of Discovery in the Roscoe Pound Tradition, 78 F.R.D. 267, 269 (1978).
163. Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra note 161, at 854.
164 . See CHARLES A. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES: THE TREBLE
DAMAGE ACTIONS 83 (1973).
165. Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra note 161, at 854–55. The penalties were “$2 million in
fines, some short jail sentences for relatively low-level defendant-employees, and consent de-
crees.” Id .
166. BANE, supra note 164, at 50; Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra note 161, at 855.
167. Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra note 161, at 855.
168 . Id .
169 . Id .
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Committee on Pretrial Procedure to “consider[] the problems arising from
discovery procedures in multiple litigation filed in different judicial districts
but with common witnesses and exhibits.”170 The new subcommittee, termed
the Coordinating Committee on Multiple Litigation (CCML), was chaired by
Chief Judge Alfred P. Murrah of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit.171 Eventually, it grew to include nine circuit and district judges.172
Lacking formal authority over district judges who were assigned electri-
cal equipment cases, the committee’s modus operandi was to “encourage”
judges to enter uniform orders that it drafted.173 Judges “sat together at ar-
guments, conferred, and issued proposed orders that were then sent back to
the more than thirty district courts in which the cases were pending.”174
Through these orders, the committee effectively created a coordinated na-
tionwide discovery program.
“In order to manage the nationwide depositions of defense witnesses,
the plaintiffs’ lawyers met in Chicago to appoint a ‘steering committee’ ” that
divided the discovery workload.175 As litigation progressed, the committee
developed damages models and settlement proposals.176 Manufacturers re-
fused to negotiate until 1963. That year, Chief Judge Sylvester J. Ryan of the
Southern District of New York, Judge Edwin A. Robson of the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois, and Judge Wilfred Feinberg of the Southern District of New
York made a push for settlement in cases against General Electric (G.E.), the
largest defendant.177 G.E. agreed to settle all litigation against it for $300 mil-
lion, the dam broke, and most other manufacturers agreed to settle.178
The CCML planned to handle the remaining cases by transferring all
cases involving a product line to a single judge for trial. However, the plan
hit a roadblock when the largest remaining defendant, I-T-E Circuit Breaker,
vociferously objected to its cases being transferred to Chicago.179 I-T-E
sought a writ of mandamus to prevent William H. Becker, a district judge
from the Western District of Missouri and member of the CCML, from
transferring his cases pursuant to the committee’s plan.180 The Eighth Circuit
rejected the petition, noting that what I-T-E “seemingly wants done is simply
to have all of the suits against it left alone.”181 With its cases consolidated in
170 . Id . at 856 (quoting Press Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts 1 (Feb. 7, 1962)
(on file with the Michigan Law Review)).
171 . Id .
172 . Id .
173 . Id . at 857.
174. Resnik, supra note 30, at 32.
175. Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra note 161, at 858.
176 . Id .
177 . Id . at 859.
178 . Id .
179 . Id . at 860.
180 . See I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. Becker, 343 F.2d 361, 362 (8th Cir. 1965).
181 . Id .
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Chicago, I-T-E settled on the first day of trial.182 “Once I-T-E settled, settle-
ments of the rest of the cases followed quickly . . . and by the end of 1966 the
litigation was over.”183
Though the defendants complained that they had been coerced into set-
tling, the CCML’s management of the litigation was hailed as a model for
managing complex litigation.184 The I-T-E episode, however, exposed the
fragility of the committee’s ad hoc approach. As a defense lawyer observed,
resolving the electrical equipment litigation required “an extraordinary exer-
cise in the use of judicial prestige and persuasion.”185 Had I-T-E prevailed in
its objections—or had a district court judge refused to go along with the
committee’s “suggestions”—the effort to manage the litigation in a coherent
manner would have failed.
These problems provided the impetus for the Multidistrict Litigation
Act of 1968. The key figures in drafting and lobbying for the statute were
Judges Murrah and Becker, and Phil C. Neal, the Dean of the University of
Chicago Law School.186 Senator Joseph Tydings, the Democratic chair of the
Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, helped steer
the bill through Congress.187
Section 1407’s authors realized that more cases like the electrical equip-
ment litigation lay in the future.188 They also believed that “power had to be
centralized before judges who could manage cases to a conclusion, as was
accomplished in the mass settlements of the electrical-equipment cases.”189
Beyond this, the drafters confronted a classic problem of statutory design.
Apart from the need for centralized management of geographically dispersed
cases, how courts would resolve future mega-litigation was not obvious. The
discovery program that worked in the electrical equipment litigation was
specifically designed for that case. What procedures would courts use to
clear hundreds or thousands of cases filed following an airplane crash,190
massive securities fraud,191 or the release of a defective drug or medical de-
vice?192 When MDL’s drafters attempted to formalize the process that had
182 . See BANE, supra note 164, at 378.
183. Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra note 161, at 860.
184 . See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, supra note 62, at vi,
vi–viii (transcribing Chief Justice Earl Warren’s address before the American Law Institute).
185. Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra note 161, at 861 n.192 (quoting Breck P. McAllister,
Judicial Administration of Multiple-District Treble Damage Litigation, 1966 ANTITRUST L.
SYMP. 55, 58).
186 . See Bradt, supra note 13, at 92–93.
187 . Id . at 92.
188. Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra note 161, at 907.
189 . Id .
190 . E .g ., In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977).
191 . E .g ., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
192 . E .g ., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2005).
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worked in the electrical equipment litigation, they confronted a “known un-
known.”
That problem would have been familiar to lawmakers who enacted stat-
utes that charge an agency with processing a large number of claims. Con-
sider the system of administrative courts that operates within the Social
Security Administration (SSA).193 To administer the Social Security Disabil-
ity Insurance and the Supplemental Security Income programs, SSA operates
what is “probably the largest adjudicative agency in the western world.”194 In
recent years, the agency has processed more than 2.5 million disability
claims per year, some 200,000 of which were resolved after an ALJ hear-
ing.195
The principal statute that authorizes SSA to operate this system is sec-
tion 205 of the Social Security Act.196 That section was enacted as part of
1939 amendments that added survivors and dependent benefits to the prior
program of old-age and unemployment insurance, creating the basic struc-
ture of modern social security.197 When Congress enacted section 205, it act-
ed with as little information as section 1407’s drafters.198 Legislators would
have assumed that Article III courts could not be entrusted to adjudicate
claims under new title II of the Social Security Act.199 But apart from this,
how claims should be processed was unknown. The Social Security system
was only four years old and, to that point, had only paid benefits to retirees
and their survivors. 200 The system faced major administrative challenges in
the first years of its operation.201 Its constitutionality was settled only in
193 . See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983); JERRY L. MASHAW
ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS (1978).
194. MASHAW ET AL., supra note 193, at xi.
195 . SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SSA PUB. NO. 13-11700, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO
THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, 2017, at 2.77 tbl.2.F6, 2.80 tbl.2.F9 (2018), https://www
.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2017/supplement17.pdf [https://perma.cc/WAN3-
FGYG].
196. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (2012 & Supp. 2018).
197. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, 53 Stat. 1360, 1368; see
Patricia P. Martin & David A. Weaver, Social Security: A Program and Policy History, 66 SOC.
SECURITY BULL., no. 1, 2005, at 1, 3–6.
198. Phyllis E. Bernard, Social Security and Medicare Adjudications at HHS: Two Ap-
proaches to Administrative Justice in an Ever-Expanding Bureaucracy, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 339,
363 (1993).
199 . See Mark Tushnet, The Story of Crowell: Grounding the Administrative State, in
FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 359, 367–68 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010) (describ-
ing Progressive lawmakers’ distrust of Article III courts and their use of expert tribunals as
substitutes).
200. Bernard, supra note 198, at 363–64.
201 . See LARRY W. DEWITT ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 5
(2008) (“For years, Social Security employees faced problems matching employers’ contribu-
tions with the appropriate workers, and they were even tasked with tracking down covered
employers and workers and making sure they were participating in the program.”).
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1937.202 Existing administrative courts, such as those in the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, operated in different contexts and handled many fewer
claims than social security would ultimately come to handle.203 Even the
scope of federal disability benefits was unknown: the modern disability pro-
gram was not created until two decades later.204
Like the Multidistrict Litigation Act, the creation of the Social Security
Act required Congress to act in an information vacuum. Congress saw the
necessity for an institution that could process a flood of claims. But it did
not, and could not, foresee the procedures that would be needed to process
those claims.
B. Statutory Design
The information vacuum that lawmakers operated in when enacting title
II of the Social Security Act and, later, the Multidistrict Litigation Act is a
basic feature of modern lawmaking.205 Congress faces constant pressure to
address social problems. But lawmakers often lack a good understanding of
the problem Congress is being asked to regulate and the costs and benefits of
competing policy responses. In recognition of lawmakers’ myopia, one polit-
ical scientist describes the job of a member of the House of Representatives
as “legislating in the dark.”206 But legislating in the dark carries political risk.
Badly designed legislation may fail to accomplish its objectives, have unin-
tended consequences, or even exacerbate the problem Congress set out to
address.207 Lawmakers thought to have contributed to these problems expect
to be punished at the polls.
One solution familiar from contemporary legislative politics is for Con-
gress to do nothing.208 In doing so, lawmakers bet that the political costs of
inaction are lower than the costs of legislating in the dark. But for much of
the twentieth century, Congress followed a different strategy: delegation.
That is, Congress made basic policy choices itself and tasked an agency with
202 . See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548 (1937); Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
203 . See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1237–42 (1986).
204 . See, e .g ., JONAH GELBACH & DAVID MARCUS, A STUDY OF SOCIAL SECURITY
LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9 (2016); Charles I. Schottland, Social Security Amend-
ments of 1956: A Summary and Legislative History, SOC. SECURITY BULL., Sept. 1956, at 3.
205 . See, e .g ., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, THE POLITICS OF
INFORMATION: PROBLEM DEFINITION AND THE COURSE OF PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA ch. 4
(2015); JAMES M. CURRY, LEGISLATING IN THE DARK: INFORMATION AND POWER IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2015).
206 . See CURRY, supra note 205, at 4.
207 . See THEDA SKOCPOL & VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY AND THE REMAKING
OF REPUBLICAN CONSERVATISM 162–63 (updated ed. 2016).
208 . See generally Symposium, The American Congress: Legal Implications of Gridlock, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065 (2013).
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formulating “subsidiary administrative policy within the prescribed statutory
framework.”209
For instance, section 205(a) of the Social Security Act provides that the
SSA “shall have full power and authority to make rules and regulations and
to establish procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of this subchap-
ter, which are necessary or appropriate to carry out such provisions.”210 That
section goes on to direct the agency to “adopt reasonable and proper rules
and regulations to regulate and provide for the nature and extent of the
proofs and evidence and the method of taking and furnishing the same in
order to establish the right to benefits hereunder.”211 Rather than lay down
rules of procedure itself, Congress delegated to the SSA.
The policy logic for such delegations is captured in the attorney general’s
landmark 1941 report on administrative procedure.212 As the report explains,
“inherent limitations upon [Congress’s] own functioning” argue “against ac-
tion by Congress itself.”213 Those limitations include “[t]he total time availa-
ble” for members of Congress to consider legislation, the “[l]ack of
specialized information,” and the “lack of a staff or a procedure adapted to
acquiring it.”214 Even if Congress is able to work out all the details of statuto-
ry policy itself, there remains “constant danger of harmful rigidity” if the re-
sults “crystallize[] in the form of a statute.”215 Thus, there is “steady
pressure . . . to assign such tasks to the controlled discretion of some other
agency.”216
Since Congress created the first modern agency in 1887, statutes that
delegate regulatory authority have been attacked for authorizing another in-
stitution to exercise Congress’s Article I powers.217 But for nearly as long as
these objections have been advanced, they have failed. Since 1928, the Su-
preme Court has held that a statute satisfies Article I as long as it contains an
“intelligible principle” that guides the delegate’s discretion. And the Supreme
Court has struck down only three statutory provisions—each part of poorly
209. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424–25 (1944).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (2012 & Supp. 2018).
211 . Id .
212. ROBERT H. JACKSON, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (1941). For the history of the report and the politics of the New
Deal era, see DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014), and George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The
Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1594–
97 (1996).
213. JACKSON, supra note 212, at 14.
214 . Id .
215 . Id .
216 . Id .
217 . See, e .g ., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1722 & n.4 (2002). Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution provides
that “[a]ll legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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drafted statutes that were enacted at the height of the New Deal—for lack of
an intelligible principle.218
The Multidistrict Litigation Act delegates authority in manner that is
strikingly similar to statutes like section 205 of the Social Security Act. In
fact, it delegates twice. Section 1407 authorizes the JPML to override plain-
tiffs’ forum choice and move cases to a single district court for coordinated
pretrial management.219 Similar to many statutes administered by an admin-
istrative agency, the standard for centralization is highly discretionary. The
Panel is authorized to transfer cases if it finds that doing so “will be for the
convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient
conduct of such actions.”220
Once the Panel redirects cases to a single district court, section 1407 del-
egates authority to the transferee court to conduct “coordinated or consoli-
dated pretrial proceedings.”221 In its “contemporary legal context,”222 this
instruction would reasonably have been understood as a direction to develop
procedures necessary to resolve big cases that would otherwise clog the fed-
eral courts. The electrical equipment litigation was resolved only because
managerial judges wrested control of the litigation from parties and devised
a series of novel procedures that catalyzed a global resolution.223 In propos-
ing section 1407, MDL’s backers repeatedly cited the need to formalize this
process and make it broadly available. The drafters assumed the FRCP and
Article III vested the transferee court with sufficient authority to develop
novel procedures to manage transferred cases. Instructing the transferee
court to conduct “coordinated” pretrial proceedings, section 1407 told trans-
218 . See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding
that § 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act lacked an intelligible principle); Pan. Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (same, National Industrial Recovery Act § 9(c)); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (same, price-fixing provisions of the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935). Even the well-organized attack on federal administration that has
emerged from the conservative legal movement in recent years has failed to make headway
against statutes that delegate regulatory authority. In 2010, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote,
“No one doubts Congress’s power to create a vast and varied federal bureaucracy.” Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010). But see Gundy v. United
States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that “[i]f a majority of this
Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would
support that effort”).
219. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
220 . Id .
221 . Id .
222. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 178 (2008)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 698–99 (1979)); see
also New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (“[I]t’s a ‘fundamental canon of
statutory construction’ that words generally should be ‘interpreted as taking their ordinary . . .
meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute.’ ” (last alteration in original) (quoting
Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018))).
223 . See supra text accompanying notes 162–185.
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feree judges to treat future litigation crises like the electrical equipment cas-
es.
Indeed, this is precisely how the statute was interpreted by contempo-
rary observers. A Wall Street Journal article reporting on the passage of sec-
tion 1407 observed that the parties to the electrical equipment litigation
“developed a nationwide pretrial discovery program” that “included the use
of uniform sets of interrogatories and orders for the furnishing of docu-
ments, creation of central depositories for papers common to many cases,
and the taking of joint depositions in which key witnesses were examined by
representative counsel on questions common to the various cases.”224 The
new multidistrict litigation statute “establish[ed] formal legal machinery for
consolidating pretrial handling of groups of similar cases.”225 It “likely”
would “result in a substantial speedup in the handling of basically similar
civil court suits.”226
Or consider the views of Philip Price, Esq., a partner at Dechert, Price
and Rhoads, who submitted comments opposing section 1407 when it was
being considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee.227 Price represented I-
T-E Circuit Breaker in the electrical equipment litigation.228 He objected to
“the extraordinarily broad scope of the proposed section” and “the unlimited
power which it would vest, not in any court as heretofore constituted, but in
a ‘judicial panel.’ ”229 In the transferee court, Price complained, judges would
wield their power to “club[] into settling their cases parties who did not show
what the judges thought was sufficient enthusiasm.”230 This is perhaps a self-
serving view of the electrical equipment litigation, and Price’s account of
transferee judges’ motivations can certainly be questioned. But his letter
makes clear that sophisticated observers well understood the effects of sec-
tion 1407’s delegations. As Price stated: “[W]hat happened in [the electrical
equipment] cases is a guide to what may be expected under the proposed
§ 1407.”231
Because section 1407’s drafters believed that the FRCP gave transferee
judges all the authority they needed to devise procedures necessary to resolve
big cases, section 1407 does not explicitly grant transferee judges procedure-
224 . Congress Passes Bill to Speed Up Handling of Similar Civil Suits, WALL STREET J.,
Mar. 20, 1968, at 12.
225 . Id .
226 . Id .
227 . Multidistrict Litigation: Hearings Before the Subcomm . on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the S . Comm . on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 95 (1966) (Letter from Philip Price,
Esq., of Philadelphia, Pa., to Sen Senator Hugh Scott).
228 . Id . at 97.
229 . Id . at 95.
230 . Id . at 97.
231 . Id. at 96.
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making authority beyond that which generally exists in the Rules.232 Nor did
the drafters expressly limit transferee courts’ procedure-making authority in
the manner characteristic of statutes administered by an agency.233 Still, the
nature and limits of section 1407’s delegation are apparent from its text and
history. The statute reflects an expectation that transferee courts manage
cases to resolution by explicitly recognizing the possibility that transferred
actions will be resolved in the transferee court.234 Read against the backdrop
of the electrical equipment litigation, section 1407 also reflects an expecta-
tion that procedural innovation would be central to that process.235 At the
same time, the failure to create new procedure-making authority in the
transferee court—and the instruction in section 1407(f) that the JPML’s rules
be “not inconsistent with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure”—suggests that limitations on district court discretion imposed
by the FRCP and due process carry over to MDL.
Although section 1407 does not expressly recognize transferee judges’
authority to devise new procedures, that power was created by 1983 amend-
ments to Rule 16. Enacted with a package of rule amendments intended to
encourage managerial judging,236 amended Rule 16 authorizes district court
judges to “adopt[] special procedures for managing potentially difficult or
protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult
legal questions, or unusual proof problems.”237 The category of cases to
which the amended rule applies—complex litigation—overlaps substantially
with the big cases that preoccupied MDL’s drafters. The amendment makes
explicit what section 1407 assumes—that transferee judges will be procedural
innovators.
232. Section 1407 does authorize the JPML to “prescribe rules for the conduct of its busi-
ness not inconsistent with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 28
U.S.C. § 1407(f) (2012).
233 . Cf ., e .g ., 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2018) (directing the Social Security
Administrator to provide “a statement of the case, in understandable language, setting forth a
discussion of the evidence, and stating the Commissioner’s determination and the reason or
reasons upon which it is based,” when rejecting a disability claim); 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(b)
(2012) (specifying evidence that the court may consider in making awards under the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program).
234. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (“Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or
before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred
unless it shall have been previously terminated . . . .” (emphasis added)).
235 . See Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra note 161, at 916 (“The judges’ contemporaneous
papers demonstrate that, far from a modest tweak, they intended MDL to be an ambitious
statute designed to transfer power over nationwide litigation from the hands of litigants and
dispersed judges into the hands of a single judge who could shepherd the litigation to a final
resolution.”); cf . Charles R. Clark, Pre-Trial Orders and Pre-Trial as a Part of Trial, in Proceed-
ings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Judges, 23 F.R.D. 319, 506 (1958)
(“[P]erhaps the greatest advantage and the most striking characteristic of the federal rules is
the power and the discretion they give to the trial judge.”).
236 . See generally supra note 138 and accompanying text.
237. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(L).
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MDL’s similarity to statutes that delegate authority to an administrative
agency raises the question why Judges Becker and Murrah did not propose a
“multidistrict litigation agency” when they put forward section 1407. The
simplest explanation is that the idea appears not to have occurred to the
judges, who were focused on codifying the structure that was successfully
used to resolve the electrical equipment litigation.238 More fundamentally,
Congress could not have created such an agency without violating Article III.
MDL courts finally resolve private claims, and they “exercise[] the range of
jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts.”239 Under
Crowell v . Benson and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v . Schor,
these are functions that only an Article III court may perform. 240
C. The Operation of the Statute
MDL’s similarity to public regulatory programs continues with the way
it operates in practice. But there is an important difference between MDL
and administrative programs like Social Security: MDL operates within the
legal framework governing ordinary civil litigation, rather than the APA. Ac-
cordingly, MDL lacks structures that Congress and courts implemented to
improve the transparency, accountability, and accessibility of the adminis-
trative process.
This Section outlines the functional similarities and structural differ-
ences between MDL and agency-administered programs. The following Sec-
tion recounts the origins of the structural features of modern agency
administration and explains how the absence of those features in MDL af-
fects MDL’s legitimacy.
1. Overcoming Problems Through Bottom-Up Innovation
As Part I recounted, MDL is a world of procedural innovation. The
JPML selects a judge whom it believes will competently manage the litiga-
tion. In the transferee court, the judge exercises her authority under the Fed-
eral Rules and section 1407 to manage the case to resolution—a process that
often involves the adaption, development, and approval of new procedures.
Successful procedures spread to other MDLs through the network of lawyers
and transferee judges who control large MDLs.
With this, compare procedural design in agencies like the SSA. An initial
example involves the creation of the Social Security Appeals Board (now
called the Appeals Council), a body of ALJs within the agency that reviews
front-line ALJ decisions to improve the system’s accuracy and uniformity.241
238 . See Bradt, Radical Proposal, supra note 161, at 863–71.
239 . See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
240 . Id .; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 59 (1932).
241. An applicant for social security disability benefits currently may request review by
the Appeals Board. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1467 (2019). The Appeals Board’s regulations also author-
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As the Board’s director explained in 1959 testimony to the House Ways and
Means Committee, the need for an internal appeals process arose from the
slow pace of judicial review in Article III courts.242 The original Social Secu-
rity Act did not expressly authorize SSA to provide an internal appeals pro-
cess, but the agency nevertheless provided one.243 Later amendments to the
Social Security Act confirmed the agency’s general authority to make proce-
dure244 and formally recognized the Appeals Board.245 As Pamela Bookman
and I show, this pattern of bottom-up innovation followed by legislative cod-
ification characterizes many ad hoc procedural statutes.246
A more recent example of procedural design within the SSA is the medi-
cal vocational guidelines, colloquially known as the “grids,” that the agency
uses to adjudicate disability insurance claims.247 Under the Social Security
Act, an individual is entitled to disability benefits if she cannot “engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment.”248 Before SSA adopted the grids, the availa-
bility of work was established through testimony of vocational experts who
testified at individual disability hearings.249 This method was criticized for
producing inconsistent outcomes and requiring the agency to pay for repeat-
ed testimony on an issue that should not have varied from claimant to
claimant.250
To address these problems, the SSA invoked its authority “to establish
procedures” under section 205 to promulgate the grids, which answer
whether a claimant is disabled based on the claimant’s age, education, work
history, and functional limitations.251 The grids aggregate information from
national hiring and occupational surveys and are updated as new versions of
ize it to review the grant of benefits on its own motion, but this authority is rarely exercised.
See id . § 416.1469.
242 . Administration of Social Security Disability Insurance Program: Hearings Before the
Subcomm . on the Admin . of the Soc . Sec . Laws, H . Comm . on Ways & Means, 86th Cong. 641
(1960) (statement of Joseph E. McElvain, Director of the Office of Hearings and Appeals)
[hereinafter McElvain Testimony].
243 . See generally Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
244 . See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, 53 Stat. 1360,
1368.
245 . See Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. 89–97, § 102(a), 79 Stat. 286, 330
(1965).
246 . See Bookman & Noll, supra note 29, at 788–91, 804–07 (discussing, inter alia, sec-
tion 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act).
247 . See MASHAW, supra note 193, at 117–23.
248. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2012).
249 . See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 (1983).
250 . See id .
251 . See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 (2012).
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those surveys are released.252 To determine whether an individual is unable
to find work in the national economy (and therefore disabled), an ALJ enters
the individual’s characteristics into the grids and the grids supply an an-
swer.253
In Heckler v . Campbell, the Supreme Court rejected constitutional and
statutory arguments that the grids deprived claimants of a fair hearing.254
The agency processed “[a]pproximately 2.3 million claims for disability ben-
efits” per year, the Court observed, making the need for efficiency “self-
evident.”255 The grids deprived individual litigants of the opportunity to be
present when evidence relevant to a key element of their claim was devel-
oped. But the survey data could be challenged in an action for judicial review
of the grids,256 and an individual whose condition was not covered by the
grids could “bail out” and demonstrate disability through individualized
proof.257 Thus, the Court concluded that the grids were consistent with due
process and the APA.
Many more examples of ad hoc procedure-making in the SSA and other
agencies could be cited.258 But these suffice to show the basic point: like an
MDL transferee court, the SSA devises procedures to address procedural
problems that Congress did not—and could not—foresee when it enacted
the agency’s enabling statute.259
252. Brief of the United States, Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983) (No. 81–1983),
1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 669, at *16 n.6.
253. In general, the grids give a yes/no answer to whether a claimant is disabled, or direct
the ALJ to consult a vocational expert if the surveys that the grid is based upon do not indicate
the availability of work for individuals with the claimant’s combination of characteristics. See 1
J. DOUGLAS PETERS, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS § 1.8, Westlaw (database updated
June 2018).
254. 461 U.S. 458.
255 . Heckler, 461 U.S. at 461 n.2.
256 . See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–702, 704 (2012 & Supp. 2018) (generally authorizing judicial
review of “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court”).
257 . Heckler, 461 U.S. at 462 n.5.
258 . See, e .g ., Gerald K. Ray & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Government Success Story: How Data
Analysis by the Social Security Appeals Council (with a Push from the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States) Is Transforming Social Security Disability Adjudication, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1575, 1604 (2015) (describing the development of the SSA’s data analysis pro-
gram and the “dramatic gains in productivity and quality of decisionmaking” that it produced
(cleaned up)); Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action,
126 YALE L.J. 1634 (2017) (describing the development of group claim-processing procedures
in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Office of Medicare Hearings and Ap-
peals and the use of “Omnibus Proceedings” within the National Vaccine Injury Compensa-
tion Program); Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors,
60 FLA. L. REV. 1103 (2008) (describing the development of “Fair Fund” procedures within the
SEC).
259. The procedure-making that occurs in MDL is largely retroactive, because it is de-
signed to address litigation crises after they arise. In the administrative law context, the Su-
preme Court has held that statutes authorizing agency rulemaking should be presumed not to
authorize retroactive rules, Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988), but
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2. MDL’s Relationship to Other Forms of Aggregation Litigation
This Article is not the first to note the parallels between public adminis-
trative programs and aggregate litigation. As Nathaniel Donahue and John
Fabian Witt observe, early twentieth-century workers’ compensation statutes
“formalized for work accidents what virtually private and more-or-less de-
centralized mechanisms [for resolving claims] had been trying to achieve for
half a century and more.”260 Harry Kalven and Maurice Rosenfield’s seminal
essay on the midcentury class action likened it to a “semi-public remedy ad-
ministered by the lawyer in private practice.”261 More recently, Richard Na-
gareda observed that—like workers’ compensation statutes and the social
security grids—mass tort settlements rationalize the resolution of thousands
of related claims using rules of thumb derived from litigated and settled cas-
es.262
MDL settlements similarly rely on grids, rules of thumb, and algorithms
to resolve masses of related cases, based on claim values discerned from pri-
or verdicts and settlements. But MDL differs from the settlements that pre-
occupied Nagareda in a crucial respect: they are the product of deliberate
congressional choice. Read against the backdrop of the electrical equipment
litigation and the discretion that district courts generally exercise under the
FRCP, section 1407 is appropriately read as a delegation to transferee courts
to devise procedures necessary to resolve big cases. District courts have used
that statutory authority to empower leadership to act on behalf of consoli-
dated plaintiffs and to devise novel procedures for asserting, processing, and
liquidating actions. Thus, when MDL leaders propose a resolution, they act
pursuant to authority that has been delegated by Congress (in sweeping gen-
eral terms) and further specified by transferee judges (through, for example,
leadership appointment orders, case management orders, and orders facili-
tating settlement).263
Perhaps because he wrote in the era before MDL had become the domi-
nant forum for large-scale litigation, Nagareda overlooked the statutory un-
derpinning for MDL settlements. Because of that, he believed that aggregate
settlements suffer from a perpetual crisis of authority. Lacking authority to
represent clients beyond the limits of traditional attorney–client relation-
also held that the propriety of retrospective agency action ultimately turns on whether it is jus-
tified by considerations that outweigh its costs to rule-of-law values, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194, 202–05 (1947) (discussing standards established via agency adjudication).
260. Nathaniel Donahue & John Fabian Witt, Tort as Private Administration, 105
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 13) (on file with the Michigan Law Re-
view).
261. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 717 (1941).
262 . See, e .g ., RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 57–70
(2007) [hereinafter NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS]; Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to
Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 921 (1996).
263. Thanks to Teddy Rave for pushing me on this point.
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ships and Rule 23, lawyers nevertheless negotiate global resolutions to factu-
ally related cases.264 For Nagareda, private lawyers—not judges—were the
actors analogous to agency heads who devise new procedures. And private
lawyers decidedly lacked authority to impose global peace on unwilling par-
ties.
Whether or not Nagareda was correct about the crisis of authority out-
side of MDL, it is not the case that MDL settlements take place in a vacuum
of statutory authority. A transferee judge exercises authority under section
1407 and the Federal Rules. Dominant uses of that authority are to drive set-
tlement and to devise procedures that facilitate it—such as bellwether trials,
case inventory orders, and centralized control of litigation in a PSC. Of
course, MDL settlements are subject to due process limitations. But they do
not occur in the legal no man’s land Nagareda portrayed. They are, instead,
the consequence of section 1407’s statutory design.265
3. Structural Differences Between Procedure-Making in MDL and
Administrative Agencies
MDL resembles a public administrative program in the problem that
motivated Congress to enact its enabling statute, the structural choices Con-
gress made in that statute, and the way the statute functions. But procedure-
making in MDL is structured differently than in administrative agencies
such as the SSA. This is because MDL operates under the statutes and rules
governing ordinary civil litigation,266 whereas administrative agencies are
governed by the APA.267 This difference in the systems’ statutory underpin-
nings results in substantial differences in how administrative agencies, on
the one hand, and MDL courts, on the other, use delegated authority to
make procedure.
Again, the Social Security Administration provides a useful comparison.
Because the agency is subject to the APA,268 it has a general obligation to
264 . See NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS, supra note 262, at 58 (“Both workers’ compensation
and grid-like rules for public benefits have achieved a high degree of institutional legitimacy.
By contrast, court-administered statistical sampling and mass tort class settlements have not.”).
265. The statutory basis for MDL resolutions is also deemphasized in accounts that stress
operational parallels between MDL, class actions, and bankruptcy. See, e .g ., Alexandra D. La-
hav, Essay, The Continuum of Aggregation, 53 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
266 . See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (authorizing transferee judge to conduct “coordinat-
ed or consolidated pretrial proceedings”); 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 59, § 3866 (“Courts
interpret the phrase ‘pretrial proceedings’ [in 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)] broadly, to give the transfer-
ee judge control over any and all proceedings before trial. The transferee judge inherits the en-
tire pretrial jurisdiction that the transferor court could have exercised had the case not been
transferred.” (footnote omitted)).
267 . See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012 & Supp. 2018) (setting out procedures for “each authority
of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by an-
other agency,” excepting Congress, the courts, and certain territorial and military institutions).
268 . See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 409 (1971) (stating that the Social Security
Act’s hearing procedure “does not vary from that prescribed by the APA”).
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make agency records available under the APA’s freedom-of-information
provisions.269 When promulgating the medical-vocational grids, the APA
required the agency to “give interested persons an opportunity to partici-
pate.”270 In particular, the APA required agencies to provide advance notice
of its intent to adopt the grids,271 make data and analysis supporting the
grids available for public inspection,272 and respond to nonfrivolous com-
ments before the grids were promulgated.273 The final grids were subject to
judicial review under the substantial-evidence and arbitrary-and-capricious
standards.274
Procedural development in MDL is more opaque. The dominant mode
of procedure-making in mega-MDLs is for leadership to “work out” a solu-
tion to an emergent procedural problem that is adopted or so-ordered by the
transferee judge.275 Lead counsel may consult non-lead counsel in these ne-
gotiations but have no legal obligation to do so. Indeed, leadership often will
have strategic reasons for excluding non-lead counsel from crucial proce-
269 . See 5 U.S.C. § 552.
270. Id . § 553(c).
271. Id . § 553(b). (“General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Fed-
eral Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or other-
wise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law.”). “The Courts of Appeals have
generally interpreted this to mean that the final rule the agency adopts must be ‘a “logical out-
growth” of the rule proposed.’ The object, in short, is one of fair notice.” Long Island Care at
Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174 (2007) (citations omitted) (quoting Nat’l Black Media
Coal. v. FCC, 791 F.2d 1016, 1022 (2d Cir. 1986)).
272 . See, e .g ., Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(“Under APA notice and comment requirements, ‘[a]mong the information that must be re-
vealed for public evaluation are the “technical studies and data” upon which the agency relies
[in its rulemaking].’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Chamber of Comm. of the U.S. v. SEC,
443 F.3d 890, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2006))); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (“It is not consonant with the purpose of a rule-making proceeding to prom-
ulgate rules on the basis of inadequate data, or on data that, critical degree, is known only to
the agency.”).
273 . See, e .g ., Action on Smoking & Health v. Civilian Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d 1209,
1216 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“An agency need not respond to every comment, but it must ‘respond
in a reasoned manner to the comments received, to explain how the agency resolved any sig-
nificant problems raised by the comments, and to show how that resolution led the agency to
the ultimate rule.’ ” (quoting Rodway v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir.
1975))); Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 394 (noting that an agency must respond to comments
that satisfy a “threshold requirement of materiality”).
274 . See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706; Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed
to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be as-
cribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”).
275 . See supra notes 114–116. This finding is consistent with Gluck’s interviews of trans-
feree judges, who emphasized that the MDL bar is “[a] smaller community, repeat players.
Lawyers are more likely to encounter each other again and again, so there is an incentive for
folks to play nicely in the sandbox.” Gluck, supra note 8, at 1702.
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dural discussions.276 Non-lead counsel complain of being frozen out until
leadership proffers a take-it-or-leave-it aggregate settlement.277 Courts are
claimed to seal filings that, if made public, would embarrass leadership or
thwart efforts at global resolution.278
Apart from its reliance on informal negotiation to design procedure,
MDL is not subject to the APA-based transparency and participation norms
that govern administrative agencies. The Judicial Code does not impose
freedom-of-information requirements on district courts analogous to those
applicable to agencies.279 Some MDLs make transcripts of hearings freely
available to the public.280 In others, transcripts are only available to those
willing to spend thousands of dollars to purchase them from PACER or a
court reporter.281 An MDL court can make important procedural decisions
with little advance notice. There is nothing like the judicially enforced obli-
gation to consider and respond to comments that applies in agency proceed-
ings; case management orders set out requirements without any underlying
reasoning.
Nor are procedural innovations in MDL subject to the same level of af-
ter-the-fact scrutiny as major agency decisions. Most of the important deci-
sions in an MDL do not result in the entry of judgment, and thus are
insulated from immediate appellate review. (As noted, settlement dynamics
make it unattractive for litigants to appeal interlocutory decisions when
judgment is entered.) In contrast, final agency action is presumptively sub-
ject to judicial review under the arbitrary-and-capricious and substantial-
evidence standards, with “finality” determined through a “pragmatic” ap-
proach.282 This provides parties who believe they have been injured by agen-
cy action an opportunity for review before a neutral decisionmaker. Indeed,
preenforcement review is broadly available when agency action puts regulat-
276 . See Stephen J. Herman, Duties Owed by Appointed Counsel to MDL Litigants Whom
They Do Not Formally Represent, 64 LOY. L. REV. 1, 17–18, 18 n.60 (2018) (noting that “de-
fendants are frequently only willing to engage in such discussions under a veil of confidentiali-
ty and will discontinue the negotiations in the event of a breach”).
277. PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, LITIGATING MASS TORT CASES § 7:21, Westlaw (database up-
dated May 2018) (“The lawyer has to call friends, try to look through Pacer, or take other diffi-
cult steps to be kept abreast [of developments in MDL].”).
278 . See Burch, supra note 10, at 126 & n.286.
279 . See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. & FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TEN
STEPS TO BETTER CASE MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE FOR MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION TRANSFEREE
JUDGES 3–4 (2d ed. 2014), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/Ten-Steps-MDL-Clerks-
2D.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JBG-UWYP].
280 . See, e .g ., IN RE GENERAL MOTORS LLC IGNITION SWITCH LITIGATION, https://
gmignitionmdl.com/ [https://perma.cc/6LK5-YZKZ].
281 . See, e .g ., MDL 2804: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, U.S. DISTRICT CT., N.
DISTRICT OHIO, https://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/mdl-2804 [https://perma.cc/D333-VAB8].
282 . See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 704, 706 (2012 & Supp. 2018); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 140, 149 (1967).
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ed parties to a choice between complying with a potentially invalid directive
and incurring significant costs.283
In sum, while section 1407 shares the structure of statutes that delegate
authority to an administrative agency to overcome Congress’s myopia, MDL
courts make procedure in a different structural environment than adminis-
trative agencies. In MDL, the transferee judge’s power to adopt new proce-
dures is relatively unstructured and free of external checks. In the
administrative context, the development of new procedures requires the par-
ticipation of interested parties and is subject to ex post review as a matter of
course.
D. The Rule-of-Law Debate Revisited
The parallels and contrasts between MDL and agencies subject to the
APA go to the core of claims that MDL violates the rule of law. On one hand,
the prevalence of ad hoc, ex post procedure-making in administrative agen-
cies suggests that similar procedure-making in MDL is not fatal to MDL’s
legitimacy. If we accept procedural experimentation in important and highly
popular programs like Social Security, why should MDL be different? On the
other hand, the structural differences between procedure-making in MDL
and procedure-making in public administrative agencies suggest caution
about concluding that because ad hoc procedure is tolerated in one setting, it
is legitimate in the other.
In fact, the structural features that MDL lacks were crucial to the devel-
opment of a distinctive administrative understanding of the rule of law and
played a central role establishing the legitimacy of the modern administra-
tive state. The history of federal administration teaches that, if ad hoc proce-
dure does not threaten MDL’s legitimacy, these governance deficits do.
Indeed, they are already being exploited by interest groups seeking to “re-
form” the MDL process for self-interested reasons.
This argument draws on historical debates over the legitimacy of federal
administrative agencies and the rule of law. Accordingly, after providing
some conceptual background, this Section begins by recounting that history.
It then considers the lessons that history holds for contemporary debates
over MDL and the rule of law.
1. Conceptual Background
Claims that an institution is violating the rule of law implicate at least
two different conceptions of legitimacy.284 The argument might be that the
institution lacks legal authority to take a challenged action. From this per-
spective, the question is whether the institution’s actions are contemplated
by authorities that are recognized in the relevant legal system. For example,
283 . See Abbott Labs ., 387 U.S. at 152.
284 . See generally Fallon, supra note 135.
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one might ask whether a federal agency has statutory authority to regulate a
particular subject.285
The legal conception of legitimacy, however, has played a limited role in
debates over the legitimacy of federal administrative agencies. From the
Constitution’s earliest days, Congress delegated regulatory authority to ex-
ecutive branch actors under open-ended statutory mandates.286
Because of the breadth of Congress’s statutory delegations, attacks on
federal administrative agencies have tended to invoke the sociological con-
ception of legitimacy. The question from this perspective is whether action is
“justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support” apart from the
formal legal authority that authorizes it.287 That is, “[s]ociological legitimacy
measures the extent to which members of the relevant political community
regard a law as justified.”288 And as noted above, a key determinant of peo-
ple’s willingness to accept an institution’s actions is procedural fairness.
Again and again, social psychologists have found that people are more will-
ing to view state action as legitimate if that action is perceived as the product
of fair procedures.289
2. MDL’s Parallels to Midcentury Administrative Law
Complaints about this kind of procedural fairness were the core of a
midcentury attack on federal administration that is strikingly similar to cur-
rent attacks on MDL.290 The immediate cause was the growth in federal ad-
ministration during the New Deal. Beginning with the seventy-third
Congress, Congress created scores of new agencies and tasked them with
implementing the New Deal and bringing the U.S. economy back from the
285 . See, e .g ., David L. Noll, Arbitration Conflicts, 103 MINN. L. REV. 665 (2018) (analyz-
ing federal administrative agencies’ authority to regulate the use of arbitration in light of the
Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act).
286 . See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Founda-
tions, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1294 (2006). For example, “statutes establishing the De-
partments of War and State in the first Congress said little more than that the Secretaries of
those departments were to do what the President told them to do.” Jerry L. Mashaw, Foreword,
The American Model of Federal Administrative Law: Remembering the First One Hundred
Years, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 975, 982 (2010). The first and second banks of the United States
“handled all fiscal matters for the United States Government and, through their requirements
for redemption of bank notes in specie, regulated the money supply.” Id . at 983.
287. Fallon, supra note 135, at 1795.
288. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Political Justification for Group Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3193, 3195 (2013).
289 . See Bookman & Noll, supra note 29, at 779 & n.45 (collecting studies).
290 . See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under
Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 51–61 (2017); Shepherd, supra note 212, pts. 4–5; see generally
ERNST, supra note 212, at 119–28; JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE:
ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL 14–58 (2012).
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Great Depression.291 Some New Deal agencies followed essentially the same
procedures as courts, but others adopted a “corporatist” approach that
sought to bring methods of business administration to the public sector.292
Critics opposed to the growth of federal administration for political and ide-
ological reasons latched onto anxieties over the fairness of agency procedure
to launch a broader attack on the new agencies.293
The attack reached its highpoint in the notorious 1938 report of the
American Bar Association Special Committee on Administrative Law au-
thored by former Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound.294 The report
took aim at what it termed the “administrative absolutism” of federal regula-
tory agencies.295 As with modern attacks on MDL, the basic complaint was
that agencies were making things up as they went, to the detriment of parties
subject to their authority. Thus, the report charged agencies with “tenden-
cies” such as “arbitrary rule making for administrative convenience at the
expense of important interests” and “decid[ing] without a hearing, or with-
out hearing one of the parties.”296 With the New Deal failing to pull the na-
tion out of recession by the close of the 1930s, complaints that agencies were
a law unto themselves gained political momentum.297
As with MDL, critics of administrative agencies argued that the solution
to agencies’ “lawlessness” was to subject them to regular procedures. Indeed,
in 1941 Congress passed a bill, the Walter-Logan Act, that did just that.298
Fearing that the Act would cripple federal administration, FDR vetoed it.299
When Congress returned to administrative procedure at the close of
World War II, it did not continue on this path. Influenced by the success of
291. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 424
& n.9 (1987). Agencies created during the Seventy-Third Congress included the Tennessee
Valley Authority, the SEC, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the FCC. See
ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES
(2012), https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/Sourcebook12.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WW7-SAP6].
292 . See ERNST, supra note 212, at 56–75; see generally James Q. Whitman, Of Corporat-
ism, Fascism, and the First New Deal, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 747 (1991).
293 . See ERNST, supra note 212, at 133.
294. Roscoe Pound et al., Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 331 (1938). For the background to the report, see ERNST, supra note 212, at
121–25.
295. Pound et al., supra note 294, at 339–40.
296 . Id . at 346, 350. Pound explicitly linked these deficiencies of administrative proce-
dure to the rise of fascism in Europe. Id . at 345. As Ernst observes, the report was “a highbrow
form of red-baiting.” ERNST, supra note 212, at 126.
297 . See ERNST, supra note 212, at 132.
298. Walter-Logan Act, H.R. 6324 § 2(a), 76th Cong. (1940) (“[A]dministrative rules and
all amendments or modifications or supplements of existing rules implementing or filling in
the details of any statute . . . be issued by the head of the agency . . . only after publication of
notice and public hearings.”); id . at 2(c) (authorizing any substantially interested person to
demand reconsideration of a rule in effect for less than three years may under section (a)).
299. 86 CONG. REC. 13,942–43 (1940).
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public–private collaboration during the war mobilization effort,300 lawmak-
ers and executive branch lawyers settled on a model in which agencies were
permitted to develop new procedures, provided that they gave interested
parties an opportunity to participate in administrative decisions and agency
actions were subject to judicial review.301 In 1946, Congress codified this po-
litical settlement in the APA, a statute that supplies procedural default rules
for “each authority of the Government of the United States.”302
The new statute addressed concerns about arbitrary agency action by es-
tablishing new requirements that structured agency decisionmaking and by
liberalizing the availability of judicial review. As Joanna Grisinger observes,
the statute’s central reforms focused on the formal on-the-record hearings
that dominated agency practice at the time the APA was enacted.303 Under
the new law, regulated parties had the right to be notified of pending admin-
istrative actions.304 Hearing examiners (later renamed ALJs) were granted
statutory job protections and prohibited from receiving certain ex parte
communications.305 And the statute opened up agency action to judicial re-
view.306 These reforms, however, stopped short of subjecting agencies to in-
flexible procedures. Bringing regulated parties into the administrative
process and expanding the availability of judicial review was instead an al-
ternative to formalized procedures. As Grisinger writes, “The act protected
existing informal procedures, thus allowing cooperative relationships be-
tween regulated parties and agency officials to continue. At the same time, it
made sure that those same parties had formal tools to challenge administra-
tive action they opposed.”307
This same compromise—rejecting standardized procedures while guar-
anteeing the accessibility and accountability of the administrative process—
informs an important line of cases on notice-and-comment rulemaking. In
the 1960s and 1970s, Congress increasingly required agencies to make im-
portant decisions through informal rulemaking instead of adjudication.308
The APA itself says little about the process for informal rulemaking. Elabo-
rating on the APA’s general terms, courts in “paper hearing” cases obligated
agencies to disclose the empirical and analytical bases for their actions, to
300 . See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Foreword, Administrative War, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1343, 1376 (2014).
301 . See GRISINGER, supra note 290, at 11.
302. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012 & Supp. 2018).
303 . See GRISINGER, supra note 290, at 78.
304. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2012).
305 . Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 11, 60 Stat. 244 (1946) (“Examiners shall
be removable by the agency in which they are employed only for good cause established and
determined by the Civil Service Commission.”).
306 . 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
307. GRISINGER, supra note 290, at 108.
308 . See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32
TULSA L.J. 185, 188 (1996).
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show that they had considered evidence and argument submitted during
rulemaking, and to provide a “reasoned explanation” for their choices.309
Animating these requirements was the belief that a participatory rulemaking
process would “not only improve the quality of agency decisions and make
them more responsive to the needs of the various participating interests, but
is valuable in itself because it gives citizens a sense of involvement in the
process of government, and increases confidence in the fairness of govern-
ment decisions.”310
The model of administrative law that emerged from the APA and judi-
cial interpretations of the statute reflected a distinctive administrative rule of
law. As Grisinger writes, the APA came quickly to represent “a standard of
due process against which other government procedures might struggle to be
justified.”311
Though not without flaws,312 this understanding of the rule of law con-
tributed importantly to the legitimacy of the federal administrative state. As
the scope of federal administration expanded in the postwar decades, agen-
cies such as the SSA enjoyed consistently favorable popularity ratings.313
Agencies’ popularity has declined somewhat over the past two decades. But
even survey respondents who say they are angry about the federal govern-
ment gave positive ratings to four agencies or institutions (the military, the
Postal Service, NASA, and the Defense Department) in an April 2010 poll.314
309 . See, e .g ., United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251–53 (2d Cir.
1977); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392–94 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Int’l
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 629–31 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
310. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1761 (1975) (footnotes omitted); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accounta-
bility: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 483
(2003) (“[T]he interest group representation model [reflected in paper hearing cases] recreated
the administrative process into one that would maximize the satisfaction of popular prefer-
ences.”).
311 . See GRISINGER, supra note 290, at 107; cf . ERNST, supra note 212, at 76 (tracing the
administrative rule of law to decisions from the Hughes Court that were carried forward in the
APA).
312. As Richard Stewart observes, a model of administrative law that depends on inter-
ested parties seeking to shape administrative action is biased in favor of well-organized groups
that can coordinate members’ activities and invest in influencing administrative action. Stew-
art, supra note 310, at 1713. Their influence on the administrative process has prompted fears
of interest group “capture.” See generally PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014).
313 . See, e .g ., AM. ASS’N OF RETIRED PERSONS, SOCIAL SECURITY 75TH ANNIVERSARY
SURVEY REPORT: PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS (2010), https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/general
/social_security_75th.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQA5-5ULV]; Sally R. Sherman, Public Attitudes
Toward Social Security, SOC. SECURITY BULL., Dec. 1989, at 2.
314. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT: DISTRUST,
DISCONTENT, ANGER AND PARTISAN RANCOR 55 (2010), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/4/legacy-pdf/606.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CKT-PE6A]; see also Trust in
Government, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx [https://
perma.cc/J7F6-55XT] (finding over the past decade that between 36 percent (January 2019)
452 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:403
Polling from 2015 shows that federal agencies such as the Postal Service, the
Centers for Disease Control and Protection, the Department of Health and
Human Services, and the SSA enjoy double-digits spreads between respond-
ents who view the agency favorably and those who do not.315 Agencies’ fa-
vorability far outpaces Congress’s.316 Many administrative agencies are even
viewed more favorably than the Supreme Court, the branch of the constitu-
tional federal government with the highest favorability ratings.317
For rule-of-law theorists like Fuller, the key to agencies’ legitimacy was
that they performed different functions than common law courts. In The
Morality of Law, Fuller continued to insist that if “adjudication” is to per-
form its “true” function, it must follow established rules that give litigants
the opportunity to offer proof and argument.318 But he now argued that
“economic management” was not suited for adjudication,319 and that using
court procedures to perform managerial functions was “certain to result in
inefficiency, hypocrisy, moral confusion, and frustration.”320 Fuller thus ac-
cepted that, when the scope of state action exceeds the scale of a common
law dispute, structural protections other than common law procedure satisfy
the rule of law.
Survey data do not reveal how important the administrative rule of law
was to popular support for the federal administrative state. But it is difficult
to believe that agencies would enjoy the level of support that they presently
do if the public thought, like Dean Pound, that agencies’ failure to follow
regular procedures is fatal to their legitimacy. In the APA, lawmakers hit up-
on a model of governance that allowed legal institutions to respond to
emerging problems while providing the protection against arbitrary state ac-
tion that court procedure aims to ensure.
and 51 percent (September 2012) of survey respondents have a “great deal” or “fair amount” of
“trust and confidence . . . in our federal government in Washington when it comes to han-
dling” domestic problems).
315 . See PEW RESEARCH CTR., BEYOND DISTRUST: HOW AMERICANS VIEW THEIR
GOVERNMENT 58 (2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/11
/11-23-2015-Governance-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GES-TM39].
316 . Id . at 63 (noting that 27 percent of respondents hold a favorable view of Congress,
compared to 55 percent for the Social Security Administration).
317 . See id . at 58 (noting that 50 percent of respondents hold a favorable view of the Su-
preme Court, compared to 55 percent for the Social Security Administration).
318 . See FULLER, supra note 20, at 56. The Morality of Law was based on a series of lec-
tures given at Yale Law School in April 1963. Id . at v.
319 . Id . at 176 (“As lawyers we have a natural inclination to ‘judicialize’ every function of
government. . . . Yet we must face the plain truth that adjudication is an ineffective instrument
for economic management and for governmental participation in the allocation of economic
resources.”).
320 . Id . at 173.
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3. MDL’s Departures from the Administrative Rule of Law
Seen with the benefit of this history, the problem is not that MDL is ad
hoc. Rather, it is that MDL lacks structural features that evolved in the ad-
ministrative context to ensure that state authority is exercised responsibly
and consistently with statutory limitations. First, MDL is less accessible to
interested parties than the administrative process that precedes a major
agency action. Second, MDL provides fewer opportunities for interested par-
ties to participate in the formulation of new procedures than the administra-
tive process. Lastly, many important procedural decisions are effectively final
when they are made.
If past is prologue, these departures from the norms of public admin-
istration pose a threat to MDL’s model of resolving large-scale litigation. The
history of the federal administrative state shows that neither the delegation
of regulatory power nor the development of novel procedure in response to
emergent problems is incompatible with dominant conceptions of the rule of
law. But that history also shows that delegation without structural checks is
not a stable legal and political equilibrium. If rigid adherence to a regular
procedural playbook is incompatible with Congress’s objectives in section
1407, the administrative rule of law demands alternate protections to ensure
that delegates stay within their statutory authority and exercise their discre-
tion in a reasoned manner. These protections are largely missing in modern
MDL.
Just as opponents of federal administration latched onto the “lawless-
ness” of the administrative process to attack administration in the 1930s and
1940s, interest groups advancing a deregulatory agenda have latched onto
the “lawlessness” of the MDL process as a reason to reform it. LCJ, for ex-
ample, describes itself as a “partnership of leading corporate counsel and de-
fense bar practitioners” that “succeeds by galvanizing corporate and defense
practitioners and legal scholars.”321 Its board of directors includes perennial
MDL defendants like Merck, Pfizer, and Johnson & Johnson.322 But the
group presents its MDL reform proposals—which are, literally, a defense
wish list—as “consensus” solutions to the lack of regular procedure in
MDL.323 In the group’s telling, requiring disclosure of litigation financing,
prohibiting bellwether trials, and the like would “benefit[] all stakeholders by
providing the same fairness, clarity and certainty that the [Federal Rules] en-
sure for all other civil cases.”324
321. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, MAJOR INITIATIVES AND CURRENT AGENDA (2018),
http://www.lfcj.com/uploads/1/1/2/0/112061707/lcj_onepage_overview_january_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BVN9-NZD7].
322. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2017), http://www.lfcj.com
/uploads/1/1/2/0/112061707/lcj_annual_report_2017_final_may_1_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc
/R2SL-LNQ8].
323 . See LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 321.
324. RULES 4 MDLS, supra note 18 (emphasis added); LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, supra
note 12, at 3.
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The framing is disingenuous, but it reflects an incisive understanding of
MDL’s political vulnerabilities. As mid-twentieth-century politicians real-
ized, unfair procedure invites reform. Defenders of the modern administra-
tive state can respond to charges of unlawfulness by noting that, while
agencies are indeed laboratories of procedure, their innovation is structured
and constrained by the APA’s guarantees of transparency, participation, and
reasoned decisionmaking. Those guarantees are missing in MDL.
IV. ADAPTING MDL TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE OF LAW
Modern multidistrict litigation works in the sense that it allows Article
III courts to resolve incredibly complex controversies that could not be re-
solved through ordinary legal procedures. The tools that MDL uses to ac-
complish this—delegation of authority to an empowered manager who
develops new procedures in response to emergent problems—are basic tools
of modern public administration. But while MDL uses the tools of public
administration, it is an unusual “administrative” scheme. MDL is adminis-
tered by Article III judges, and it operates within the legal framework of or-
dinary civil litigation instead of the Administrative Procedure Act. Because it
evolved in parallel with modern administrative law, MDL lacks guarantees of
transparency, participation, and ex post review applicable to administrative
agencies. As Part III argued, these structural deficits pose the greatest threat
to MDL’s model of aggregate litigation.
Thus, the question becomes whether MDL can incorporate aspects of
the administrative rule of law that have contributed to the legitimacy of the
modern administrative state. Proposals to subject MDL to a regular rulebook
misunderstand section 1407’s objectives and statutory design. Unsurprising-
ly, they would destroy MDL’s capacity to resolve complex litigation. Other
proposals, such as expanded appellate review, are more attentive to MDL’s
governance deficits but similarly threaten MDL’s utility as a forum for re-
solving complex litigation. This tradeoff highlights a basic tension in MDL
reform proposals. Reforms that would increase MDL’s accessibility and ex-
posure to ex post review would diminish its capacity to resolve complex dis-
putes.
Drawing on examples from public administrative programs, this Part
argues that this tension is best addressed through reforms that would im-
prove the transparency, accessibility, and accountability of the MDL process
at the transferee-court level. These reforms generally take their inspiration
from institutional designs that seek to foster an “internal” separation of pow-
ers. Recognizing that many agency functions cannot be controlled through
judicial review or political oversight, those structures promote rule-of-law
values by arranging internal agency relationships in a way that promotes
transparency, participation, and reasoned decisionmaking.325 In MDL, simi-
325 . See, e .g ., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interde-
pendent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423
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lar interventions would address the opacity, inaccessibility, and lack of ex
post review by restructuring proceedings in the transferee court.
This Part first explains the problems with proposals to subject MDL to a
regular rulebook. It then considers a number of proposals with the potential
to improve the transparency, accessibility, and accountability of the MDL
system. Finally, this Part zooms out and considers a more basic objection to
MDL’s legitimacy: that it goes beyond the authority Congress has granted.
A. The Misguided Quest for MDL Rules
An initial insight from understanding that MDL functions as a system of
public administration involves proposals to subject it to a regular procedural
rulebook. As proponents of MDL-specific rules emphasize, regular proce-
dures could potentially improve MDL’s transparency and accessibility as
well as constrain the transferee court’s discretion. But when one recognizes
MDL’s administrative pedigree, it is obvious why those proposals are mis-
guided.
For example, the “Rules 4 MDLs” project is premised on the assumption
that for MDL to be fair, it must be governed by regular procedures like ordi-
nary litigation. The actual proposals that LCJ has put forward stop short of
offering a complete rulebook for MDL.326 But one can imagine what such a
rulebook would look like. Rules drafted by the defense bar might require
plaintiffs to file individual complaints, direct courts to screen complaints
through a Lone Pine device early in the lifecycle of a litigation, instruct courts
to require early evidence of specific causation, and allow individual cases to
be worked up only after general defenses that promised to dispose of many
actions all at one time were resolved. If cases survived these screens, bell-
wether trials would be prohibited and cases would be remanded within a de-
fined timeframe. This order of battle would ensure that MDLs were resolved
in a predictable manner that minimized opportunities for rent-seeking by
plaintiff’s leadership.
The difficulty is that this image of litigation is incompatible with section
1407’s design. The statute addresses Congress’s inability to anticipate the
procedures needed to resolve complex disputes by delegating authority, first
to the JPML and then to the transferee judge.327 The premise of those delega-
tions is that the procedures appropriate to resolve, say, the opioid litigation
cannot be defined ex ante. If Congress could anticipate the necessary proce-
dures, it could enact them itself.
At least since SEC v . Chenery Corp ., the necessity of such after-the-fact
lawmaking has been an accepted feature of federal administrative law.328 In
(2009); Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515
(2015).
326 . See supra notes 150–151.
327 . See supra text accompanying note 219.
328. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
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Chenery, the Supreme Court addressed complaints that the SEC had abused
its discretion by defining fiduciary duties under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935 through adjudication rather than rulemaking.329 The
Court rejected the argument, reasoning that—
problems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could not
reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the absence of a
relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience
with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into
a hard and fast rule. Or the problem may be so specialized and varying in
nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general
rule. In those situations, the agency must retain power to deal with the
problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to be effec-
tive.330
Although Chenery concerned securities regulation, it may as well have
been describing MDL. Just as the SEC could not identify all the activities that
might violate the Holding Company Act ex ante, lawmakers could not define
procedures needed to resolve, say, the opioid litigation before it occurred.
The argument that MDLs should be subject to “clear, uniform rules that ap-
ply in MDL cases” ignores this problem and the way that section 1407 ad-
dresses it.
B. Structural Reforms
Though the impulse to rule-ify MDL is misguided, this does not mean
that MDL’s reliance on ad hoc procedure-making is not a cause for concern.
As Part III showed, MDL’s guarantees of transparency, accessibility, and ac-
countability are far weaker than those that apply to modern administrative
agencies. As a prescriptive matter, understanding that MDL operates as a
form of public administration teaches that reforms should focus on these
structural deficits. While the design of those reforms is ultimately a political
question, this Part sketches several possible reforms that would better align
MDL with the administrative model it builds upon. Like Part I, this Section
focuses on “mega”-MDLs that have prompted calls for new MDL-specific
FRCP.
1. Standards and Reason-Giving
An initial insight from administrative law is that statutory standards and
reason-giving can provide some of the transparency and protection against
arbitrary decisionmaking that regular procedure aims to secure.331 Thus, the
nondelegation doctrine requires statutes that delegate regulatory authority to
329 . Chenery, 332 U.S. at 197–200.
330 . Id . at 202–03.
331 . See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253,
1279–84 (2009) (summarizing theoretical arguments for reason-giving in public programs).
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specify an “intelligible principle” to guide the delegate’s discretion,332 and
many statutes go considerably further in constraining the delegate.333 At the
back end, leading cases on judicial review of agency action require agencies
to demonstrate that challenged actions were “based on a consideration of the
relevant factors” identified by statute.334
In the MDL context, there is broad agreement on the general standards
that should govern large-scale aggregations. For example, the American Law
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation instruct that aggre-
gate proceedings should aim to “(a) enforc[e] substantive rights and respon-
sibilities; (b) promot[e] the efficient use of litigation resources; (c) facilitat[e]
binding resolutions of civil disputes; and (d) facilitat[e] accurate and just
resolutions of civil disputes by trial and settlement.”335 These goals, to be
sure, are stated at a high level of generality. Even so, recognizing them by
statute—and requiring transferee judges to explain important procedural de-
cisions by reference to them—would have positive effects on the MDL sys-
tem. Although existing empirical research is far from conclusive, there is
evidence that the combination of statutory standards and reason-giving leads
to better compliance with the governing law and reduces variance among ac-
tors exercising delegated authority.336 Those goals are shared by virtually
every participant in ongoing debates over MDL reform.
2. Transparency
Another area that is ripe for reform is MDL’s opacity, particularly for
transferred plaintiffs and their counsel. Some transferee judges direct lead
counsel to develop websites with orders and transcripts.337 But happenings in
other MDLs are inaccessible to anyone who is not willing to spend thou-
sands of dollars on PACER fees and court transcripts. Apart from basic case
information, information about MDL outcomes is notoriously difficult to
obtain. The terms of aggregate settlements are occasionally made public. But
there is no apparent rhyme or reason to the disclosure. Settlement designers
often choose to keep settlement terms confidential and file their agreement
332. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
333 . See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 86–
89, 99–120 (1999) (surveying devices Congress has used to constrain delegates’ discretion
based on a dataset of major federal laws enacted between 1947 and 1992).
334. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
335. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
Similar statements appear in the case law. See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 340 (3d
Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., concurring) (“Among the goals are redress of injuries, procedural due
process, efficiency, horizontal equity among injured claimants, and finality.”).
336 . See Edward H. Stiglitz, The Reasoning Constraint (Aug. 29, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (reporting results of experiments that test survey partici-
pants’ responsiveness to reason-giving requirements).
337 . See supra notes 280–281.
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under seal.338 Data on common benefit fees, claiming rates, and referral fees
are not systematically collected. Where such data are collected, they may be
filed under seal.339
As transferee judges increasingly recognize, there is no good reason why
basic case information should not be made available to parties and the pub-
lic. Since 1946, the APA has required agencies to make available basic infor-
mation about their structure and operations. That information includes
“statements of the general course and method by which [the agency’s] func-
tions are channeled and determined,” “rules of procedure,” “substantive
rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements of
general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and
adopted by the agency.”340 The APA further provides that “a matter required
to be published in the Federal Register and not so published” has no legal ef-
fect unless a party has notice of the matter and is not prejudiced by its non-
publication.341
Following the APA’s model, a publication requirement in MDL would
extend to case management orders, transcripts of status conferences, agree-
ments concerning the structure of the litigation, and information about pro-
posed and final settlements. To ensure that all MDLs made the same data
available, disclosure requirements would, ideally, be implemented through
amendments to section 1407. Of course, the political economy of such
amendments is fraught. Absent statutory amendments, the same require-
ments could be implemented as an FRCP, a best practice, a local rule, an in-
dividual practice, or a case management order.342
Disclosure of outcomes data is a more complicated problem. When
MDL is viewed as a form of administration, the lack of regular data on out-
comes is anomalous. Agencies are subject to a wide range of statutory re-
porting requirements, which both shape decisionmaking and allow it to be
policed by Congress.343 No such requirements apply to MDL, but parties
may have legitimate interests in keeping settlements confidential. Further-
338 . See Burch, supra note 10, at 126 & n.286.
339 . Id . at 131–32.
340. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2018). The Freedom of Information Act of 1966
imposes a separate obligation to make certain agency records available upon request. Pub. L.
No. 90-23, 80 Stat. 54 (1967) (codifying at 5 U.S.C. § 552 the amendments of the Freedom of
Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250).
341. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).
342. Although the JPML could not promulgate a disclosure rule under the plain language
of 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f) (2012) (authorizing the Panel to “prescribe rules for the conduct of its
business”), it conceivably could order improved disclosure in transfer orders entered under
§ 1407(a).
343 . See generally SAMUEL WORKMAN, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY IN THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT: HOW CONGRESS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES PROCESS INFORMATION AND SOLVE
PROBLEMS (2015).
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more, MDL practitioners contend that, without the ability to ensure confi-
dentiality, settlement would be more difficult or impossible.344
The design of a reporting scheme that balances these considerations is
beyond the scope of this Article.345 But the current system of essentially ran-
dom disclosure does not reflect a sustainable long-term equilibrium. Per-
formance monitoring is a basic feature of modern administration; the lack of
outcomes data makes such monitoring impossible in MDL.
3. Accessibility
Another of MDL’s departures from the structure of modern administra-
tion involves the accessibility of its “administrative” process. As described
above, the appointment of a leadership structure results in de facto control
of the litigation being transferred to court-appointed attorneys. Appoint-
ment orders provide varying degrees of protection for non-leads’ control of
their cases.346 But all accept that appointed leaders are in the driver’s seat.
This can result in non-leads’ exclusion from crucial discussions about the
structure and resolution of the litigation. At worst, non-leads complain that
they have no role until their clients are presented with a take-it-or-leave-it
aggregate settlement.347
The functional parallels between aggregate litigation and public admin-
istration have led some scholars to propose that the former incorporate no-
tice-and-comment procedures from public law. For example, Nagareda
proposed that an agency such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
be charged with entering a rule that memorialized the terms of an aggregate
344. Herman, supra note 276, at 16–19.
345. For an idea of the type of information outcome reporting might cover, see Proce-
dural Guidance for Class Action Settlements, U.S. DISTRICT CT., N. DISTRICT CAL.,
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/ClassActionSettlementGuidance [https://perma.cc/D3AM-
QDXA]. Following approval of a class action settlement, the guidance requires class counsel to
provide an accounting that reports, inter alia, “the number and percentage of claim forms
submitted,” “the average and median recovery per claimant,” “the largest and smallest amounts
paid to class members,” “the administrative costs,” “the attorneys’ fees and costs,” and “the at-
torneys’ fees in terms of percentage of the settlement fund.” Id .
346 . Compare, e .g ., In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 3:15-md-02672-CRB, at 4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2016), ECF No. 1084 (order ap-
pointing PSC) (“It is intended and expected . . . that . . . to the fullest extent consistent with the
independent fiduciary obligations owed by any and all plaintiffs’ counsel to their clients and
any putative class, that pretrial proceedings shall by [sic] conducted by and through the PSC.”),
with In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 14-MD-2543 (JMF), at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
26, 2014), ECF No. 304 (order establishing case management procedures) (directing that lead
counsel must “determine (after such consultation with members of the Executive Committee
and other co-counsel as may be appropriate) and present (in briefs, oral argument, or such
other fashion as may be appropriate, personally or by a designee) to the Court and opposing
parties the position of the Plaintiffs on matters arising during the coordinated pretrial proceed-
ings”).
347 . See RHEINGOLD, supra note 277, § 7:21.
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settlement.348 As he envisioned it, post-settlement rulemaking would provide
a stronger legal basis for restructuring parties’ rights and obligations than
either class actions or nonclass aggregate settlements. Rulemaking would al-
so provide an opportunity for an agency such as the FDA to review and re-
structure attorney’s fees to align attorneys’ incentives with the long-term
interests of the parties bound by a settlement.349
But notice and comment is not the only tool in administrative law’s ar-
senal, nor is it an attractive option for increasing MDL’s transparency. A
rulemaking at the conclusion of settlement negotiations would suffer from
the same limitations as a Rule 23 fairness hearing: an outsider with little in-
formation about the bargaining process and the settling parties’ resources
and risk preferences would be called on to evaluate the fairness of a deal
proffered by parties with every incentive to see it approved.350 Earlier com-
ment periods would provide a formal opportunity for non-leads to partici-
pate in important litigation decisions. But it is difficult to see how notice and
comment would map onto decisions involving privileged and confidential
information, and even a short comment period would interfere with MDL’s
capacity to resolve litigation in a timely manner. For instance, if the court
had provided a standard thirty-day comment period in Deepwater Horizon
before approving the use of pleading bundles, the case would have been de-
layed for weeks, if not months, as the structure of the pleadings was debated.
Add ten or twenty comment periods during the lifespan of a case, and the
already lengthy MDL process would drag out further.
A better model is provided by statutes that impose duties on designated
actors to act for the benefit of a class of statutory beneficiaries. For instance,
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides
that a person “is a fiduciary” with respect to a retirement plan if, among oth-
er things, “he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control
respecting management or disposition of its assets.”351 As the Supreme Court
has held, an ERISA “fiduciary” is not the same thing as a fiduciary at com-
mon law.352 Rather, the statute defines duties specific to the functions that
plan fiduciaries perform. Under Title I of ERISA, a fiduciary must “discharge
his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to partici-
348 . See NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS, supra note 262, at 257–65.
349 . See id . at 263–64.
350 . See, e .g ., William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory
Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1445 (2006) (stating that judges conducting Rule 23(e)
hearings “suffer from a remarkable informational deficit in the fairness-hearing process”);
Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 808 (1997) (“Perhaps in
no other context do we find courts entering binding decrees with such a complete lack of ac-
cess to quality information and so completely dependent on the parties who have the most to
gain from favorable court action.”).
351. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012).
352. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 253–58 (1993).
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pants and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of adminis-
tering the plan,” and act “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capaci-
ty and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise
of a like character and with like aims.”353
Leadership appointment orders in MDL already articulate similar un-
derstanding of leaders’ duties. As shown above, courts enter those orders
under FRCP that give the transferee judge authority to consolidate actions
and use special procedures in complex actions. The orders assume that lead-
ership will advance the interests of all consolidated plaintiffs. Implicitly or
explicitly, they adopt a democratic model of representation, in which leaders
are expected to advance the interests of a heterogeneous group of plain-
tiffs.354
But if appointment orders follow a model of representation with paral-
lels in public law, they do not articulate the implications for leaders’ authori-
ty and duties with anything near the specificity of ERISA. On one hand,
attorneys appointed to MDL leadership positions have greater freedom of
action than class counsel formally possess. Under the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions in Amchem and Ortiz, a single attorney may not make trade-offs
among class members who seek different, incompatible outcomes from a lit-
igation.355 That limitation follows from the model of representation the class
action is premised upon: a class representative is only permitted to act on
behalf of class members because she “possess[es] the same interest and suf-
fer[s] the same injury” as the class.356 In contrast, MDL leadership appoint-
ment orders do not assume that plaintiffs want essentially the same thing.
Instead, they give leadership limited control over non-leads’ claims to over-
come the collective action problems that would otherwise prevent cases from
progressing toward resolution. Thus, like an ERISA fiduciary or trustee,
MDL leaders have authority to make reasonable tradeoffs among the parties
for whom they perform common benefit work. Even the most basic func-
tions performed by leadership—for example, selecting one case over another
as a focus for discovery—require such tradeoffs.
The corollary is that MDL leaders have obligations to engage with “class
members” that do not apply to class counsel. Without interacting with con-
solidated plaintiffs, leaders cannot know the nature of their claims, what they
hope to accomplish from the litigation, or their capacity to contribute to its
prosecution. Accordingly, Elizabeth Cabraser and Samuel Issacharoff ob-
serve that in the Deepwater Horizon, Volkswagen, and NFL Concussion
MDLs, plaintiffs “contact[ed] class counsel frequently, [made] demands for
353. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (cleaned up).
354 . See supra text accompanying notes 78–79.
355 . See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627 (1997).
356. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348–49 (2011) (quoting E. Tex. Motor
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)).
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consumer service, [were] frequently represented by independent counsel,
and [had] points of intermediate organization on Facebook or Twitter that
allow[ed] them to function more like a group.”357 These were “gold plated”
MDLs prosecuted by leading plaintiffs’ attorneys. In less prominent cases,
non-leads complain that this level of engagement is missing.358
The appropriate policy intervention is to better define leaders’ duties
and responsibilities along the lines suggested here. That is, appointment or-
ders should explicitly recognize that leaders do not have the same obligations
as class counsel and that, because of this, they have heightened duties to en-
gage with plaintiffs for whom they perform common benefit work. In es-
sence, the proposal is to require something like the model of interactive
representation that Cabraser and Issacharoff contend already applies in
gold-standard MDLs. Like the transparency reforms sketched above, the
proposal would ideally be implemented through legislation or rulemaking,
though less formal implementation mechanisms could be used in the inter-
im.359
There remains the question of remedy: If leaders violate their duty to in-
clude non-lead counsel in decisionmaking, what is the appropriate remedy?
Commenters generally assume that violations of leadership’s duties will be
brought to the attention of the transferee judge, who will then take corrective
action—the procedure followed in the GM ignition switch litigation.360 But a
better approach might be to route complaints to a special master or an arbi-
trator identified at the outset of the litigation. Compared to routing com-
plaints to the transferee judge, doing so would provide greater protection for
confidential information and less distraction from the central work of an
MDL.
357. Cabraser & Issacharoff, supra note 112, at 865.
358 . See RHEINGOLD, supra note 277, § 7:21.
359. The selection of MDL leadership provides another opportunity to open up the MDL
process to non-lead counsel and their clients. Elizabeth Burch argues that “judges need to em-
ploy truly competitive processes in appointing lead lawyers” as opposed to relying on consen-
sus slates. Burch, supra note 10, at 138. To accomplish this, Burch recommends that judges
elicit information about: (1) counsel’s role in past MDLs and the outcomes of those litigations;
(2) “structural conflicts” between plaintiffs that are likely to arise in the course of the litigation;
(3) plans for financing the litigation; and (4) counsel’s relationship with third-party vendors.
Id . at 162–63. She proposes that judges appoint steering committees with “five to six members
who are not like-minded,” and appoint a special master who can receive objections to attor-
neys or leadership slates in confidence. Id . at 138. Burch’s proposals aim to mitigate the agen-
cy-cost problems that have preoccupied class action scholarship for decades. By providing an
opportunity for consolidated plaintiffs to weigh in on the selection of their leaders and furnish
information to the transferee court, the proposals also make MDL more accessible to consoli-
dated plaintiffs.
360 . See, e .g ., Herman, supra note 276, at 12–13; cf . Silver, supra note 85, at 1986 (noting
that non-lead attorneys’ “only recourse is to complain to the trial judge, who, for a variety of
reasons, is unlikely to be sympathetic”).
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4. Accountability
MDL’s final departure from the structure of public administration in-
volves the opportunities for ex post review of the transferee judge’s deci-
sions. As explained above, the final judgment rule bars appeals of
interlocutory case management decisions.361 Due to the unique settlement
dynamics in large MDLs, those decisions are effectively immune from ex
post review, a contrast with the broad availability of judicial review in ad-
ministrative programs.362
a . Ex post review. — The most obvious policy response would be to re-
lax the final judgment rule and allow more interlocutory decisions to be ap-
pealed to the court of appeals. Thus, Pollis proposes “a right of immediate
appellate review in MDLs from interlocutory orders that raise important is-
sues of unsettled law (or departures from settled law) and that are potentially
dispositive of a significant number of the consolidated cases.”363 Others sug-
gest that appeals be allowed in the discretion of the court of appeals.364
Even proposals to provide discretionary review of interlocutory deci-
sions, however, would have a major disruptive effect on MDL’s ability to
drive resolutions. In 2018, the median time to resolve an appeal in the feder-
al circuit courts was 8.5 months.365 The average MDL teems with important
interlocutory decisions, from the selection of lead counsel to the award of
common benefit fees. Appeals in even a handful of these matters would
compromise MDL’s capacity to resolve mega-litigation in a timely manner.
Proponents of nondiscretionary interlocutory appeals argue that this is
the price of civilization; to subject MDL to the rule of law, there must be
“meaningful” appellate review.366 But this conflates the desirability of ex post
checks on the exercise of delegated authority with the specific form of ex
post review used in ordinary civil litigation. When MDL is understood as a
form of public administration, it becomes clear that alternative institutional
mechanisms would serve the same function with fewer costs for MDL’s ca-
pacity to drive resolutions.
One such mechanism would provide for review of transferee judge’s de-
cisions by a panel of judges at the district court level. As noted above, the So-
361 . See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.
362 . See supra notes 282–283 and accompanying text.
363. Pollis, supra note 26, at 1648.
364. Perry Cooper, Consensus on MDL Problems, but Not on Solutions, BLOOMBERG L.
(June 27, 2017), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/consensus-on-mdl-problems-
but-not-on-solutions (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (citing Professor Maria Glover’s
suggestion that the rulemaking committees “import[] the Rule 23(f) discretionary appeal from
class action practice into the MDL system to allow for review when the appeals court deems it
necessary”).
365. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS FEDERAL COURT
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 2 (2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fcms_na
_appprofile1231.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/892U-82NS].
366. Pollis, supra note 26, at 1646.
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cial Security Administration has long maintained an internal appeals process
that allows claimants to seek review of adverse decisions.367 The system is
faster and more flexible than judicial review in Article III courts. In recent
years, novel analytics programs undertaken by the Social Security Appeals
Counsel “have provided information that has led to breakthroughs in how
SSA conducts training and gives feedback to staff, which has in turn led to
improved productivity and accuracy of work products.”368 A peer review sys-
tem in MDL might create the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
transferee judge’s decisions before a panel of other federal judges operating
within the transferee court. Because the system would not require the perfec-
tion of an appeal and full merits briefing, it would neither oust the district
court of jurisdiction nor require the procedural formality of a full appeal. In-
stead, reconsideration motions would be presented in much the same man-
ner as parties seek review of magistrate judge orders.369
A simple model of interlocutory peer review in MDL might subject
transferee judges’ decisions to review by a three-judge panel of other federal
judges—say, two judges with experience as an MDL transferee judge and one
circuit judge. Upon application of an interested party, the panel would have
authority by majority vote to reconsider the transferee judge’s decisions and
exercise all powers of the transferee court. Review would be available for ap-
pointment orders, rulings on pretrial motions, case-structuring decisions,
and any other action taken by the transferee judge.
By providing an opportunity for independent review of a transferee
judge’s decisions, this model would address complaints about MDL’s insula-
tion from ex post oversight. And it would be far less disruptive than expand-
ing the availability of nondiscretionary interlocutory appeals.
b . Settlement review. — Another intriguing proposal seeks to increase
private oversight of settlements that emerge from MDL consolidations. Fo-
cusing on settlements in which plaintiffs appear to be sold out by common
benefit counsel, Andrew Bradt and Theodore Rave propose that judges pub-
licly opine on the fairness of nonclass settlements. 370 According to Bradt and
Rave, “[t]he MDL judge just needs to force the disclosure of enough infor-
mation so that the individual claimants can decide for themselves whether
their lawyers are doing a good job at protecting the claimants’ interests.”371
At first glimpse, the Bradt/Rave proposal seems to address one of the
most glaring governance deficits in MDL. The decision to accept or reject an
aggregate settlement is one of the few junctures at which leadership’s deci-
367 . See supra text accompanying note 242.
368. Ray & Lubbers, supra note 258, at 1576.
369 . See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2012) (providing that a party may file objections to a mag-
istrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations, and that a district judge “shall make a
de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or rec-
ommendations to which objection is made”).
370. Bradt & Rave, supra note 30.
371 . Id . at 1298–99.
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sions are put to a market test. Yet as Bradt and Rave observe, parties who
have not been actively involved in the prosecution of the action often lack
sufficient information to make an informed decision about whether to take
the settlement.372 The proposal aims to provide a richer information base for
non-lead counsel and the plaintiffs they represent to decide whether to par-
ticipate in aggregate settlement. In so doing, the proposal promises im-
proved oversight of leadership’s work.373
But these benefits are only as strong as the advice that the transferee
judge renders, and it is not likely to be good. To see why, one can divide set-
tlements into two categories: (1) those where the district judge plays an ac-
tive role in settlement negotiations, and (2) those where the judge is not in-
involved in settlement negotiations but is asked to facilitate a deal that was
negotiated by an MDL’s leadership.374
In type 1 settlements, the incentives for the judge to serve as a trusted
“information intermediary” are not present. Where a managerial judge
pushes parties to settle, the Bradt/Rave proposal puts the judge in the posi-
tion of evaluating her own work product. Having driven the settlement, the
judge is unlikely to decide that it is fatally flawed.
In contrast, the judge in a type 2 settlement does not sit in judgment of
her own work. But she faces the same information deficit that has frustrated
judicial review of class action settlements for decades.375 A judge who did not
participate in settlement negotiations has not seen client inventories and
damages models. She is not privy to the financial position of the parties and
their attorneys. She does not know their preference or tolerance for risk. In
short, the reviewing judge approaches the settlement from the same perspec-
tive as an informed outsider like a law professor or professional objector. She
can evaluate the settlement’s general features but depends on leadership to
explain its logic.
If settlement review is unlikely to solve the information problems that
prevent plaintiffs from effectively checking the actions of MDL leadership,
what is? The need for judges to weigh in on a settlement arises from the
practical control that MDL leaders exercise over settlement negotiations. As
argued above, the most promising proposal for bringing non-lead counsel
into the MDL is to better define and enforce leadership’s duties to plaintiffs
and non-lead counsel. A judge who has been out of practice for decades is
unlikely to have a good sense of case valuation or the fairness of deal struc-
tures. An attorney with live clients is. With better representation throughout
372 . See id . at 1272 (“Often, the only real control that MDL claimants may have is over
the ultimate decision whether to consent to participate in a global settlement or to wait for re-
mand and press forward with a trial.”).
373 . See id . at 1288.
374. These categories are of course points on a spectrum, not mutually exclusive alterna-
tives.
375 . See supra note 350.
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the litigation, the need for an “information forcing” judge at the settlement
stage is diminished.
C. The Question of Statutory Authority
The reforms sketched in the preceding section would bring MDL closer
to the structure of administrative programs in which a delegate devises novel
procedures to overcome problems that could not be addressed through ex
ante lawmaking. Yet even if policymakers implemented all of these reforms,
MDL remains subject to a more fundamental criticism: that transferee judg-
es exceed the authority granted by section 1407 and the Federal Rules.376
This is a different and more basic objection than the complaint that MDL’s
structure is inconsistent with the administrative rule of law. The objection is
not that the system operates unfairly but that it is ultra vires.
Like the administrative programs it emulates, however, MDL draws up-
on broad delegations of statutory authority. Section 1407 provides that the
JPML may transfer cases pending in different district courts to a single court
“for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”377 Pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act, the scope of “pretrial proceedings” in the transferee
court is defined by the FRCP.378 The Rules, in turn, expressly authorize dis-
trict courts to control the timing and scope of motion practice and discov-
ery,379 to dispose of cases through motion practice and settlement,380 and to
manage their trial calendar.381 Furthermore, Rule 16 authorizes the district
court to “adopt[] special procedures for managing potentially difficult or
protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult
legal questions, or unusual proof problems.”382
These sources authorize many of the practices that critics attack as ultra
vires. First, they authorize the case-by-case procedural development that this
Article has argued defines modern MDL. This point was central to the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Center for Biological Diversity, Inc . v . BP America Pro-
376 . See Mullenix, supra note 141, at 553 (arguing that lawyers manipulate MDL “to ac-
complish ends the mechanism was never intended to perform”); Redish & Karaba, supra note
139, at 132 (finding that MDL consolidation was “originally envisioned as a temporary transfer
to facilitate convenience and avoid duplicative discovery” but has become a “black hole” (quot-
ing Fallon et al., supra note 96, at 2330)); id . at 154 (“[W]hile MDL promises respect for the
individual day in court, it delivers only a ‘Wild West’ form of rough group justice, on the
court-appointed steering committee’s terms.”).
377. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
378. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) (2012) (authorizing Supreme Court “to prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases in the United States district courts,” and prohibit-
ing rules from infringing “substantive right[s]”).
379 . See, e .g ., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(i), 16(a).
380 . See, e .g ., FED. R. CIV. P. 12, 16, 41, 56.
381. FED. R. CIV. P. 40.
382. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(L).
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duction Co .,383 which upheld the use of pleading bundles in the Deepwater
Horizon litigation. There, the appellant argued that the MDL court’s refusal
to create a separate pleading bundle for its claims violated the citizen-suit
provisions of three federal environmental statutes and “resulted in a de facto
dismissal of those claims.”384 Quoting Rule 16, the court of appeals answered
that “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically contemplate that in
complex matters the district court may adopt ‘special procedures for manag-
ing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex is-
sues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof
problems.’ ”385 The litigation “present[ed] an exceedingly complex matter,
consisting of hundreds of individual cases and tens of thousands of claim-
ants.”386 The court concluded: “In the face of this daunting litigation, and
given the ‘broad grant of authority’ to the district court, we perceive no error
in those aspects of the court’s management of the MDL that are involved in
this case.”387
As the Fifth Circuit’s discussion shows, the question in a challenge to
MDL’s procedural ad hockery is whether a novel procedure is grounded in a
source of court or party-rulemaking power. Often, the answer will be yes.
The broad authority that the rules give to parties and district courts provides
formal legal authority for much of MDL’s procedural development.
Second, MDL’s enabling statutes authorize the common practice of
“managing to resolution”—that is, retaining jurisdiction over transferred
cases until it is clear that the MDL is incapable of resolving transferred cases.
To be sure, section 1407’s remand clause provides that transferred actions
“shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial
proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have
been previously terminated.”388 But it defies logic to say that a clause that ex-
plicitly recognizes the possibility that a transferred action “shall have been
previously terminated” opposes pretrial resolution.
If complaints about courts’ exercise of ultra vires authority generally
miss the mark, the exception is the practice of awarding common benefit
fees to MDL leadership. From the early days of MDL, transferee courts rec-
ognized that they would need to appoint lead counsel to overcome collective
action problems in cases with hundreds or thousands of parties.389 But there
383. 704 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2013).
384 . Ctr . for Biological Diversity, 704 F.3d at 432.
385 . Id . (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(L)).
386 . Id .
387 . Id . (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006, 1013 (5th Cir.
1977)).
388. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
389 . See In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006, 1013 & n.9 (5th Cir.
1977).
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is no authority in section 1407 to rewrite contingent-fee contracts,390 and the
allocation of attorney’s fees may be “substantive” for purposes of the Rules
Enabling Act, taking the issue out of Rule 16.391 As Geoffrey Miller and
Charles Silver show, equitable doctrines that courts have invoked to reallo-
cate attorney’s fees are a shaky foundation for the practice.392
On the whole, however, most MDL procedures can be justified under
section 1407 and the Enabling Act. When MDL is seen as a form of public
administration, this should come as no surprise. Because Congress has dele-
gated broadly, the most serious objections to the legitimacy of public admin-
istrative agencies have focused on agency structure rather than the formal
authority conferred by Congress. MDL operates under similar delegations
and invites the same objections.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, it has become common for litigation crises to be re-
solved through billion-dollar settlements that resulted from MDL consolida-
tions.393 As MDL developed into a powerful mechanism for enforcing state
and federal regulatory policy, critics charged that its ad hoc procedure was
incompatible with the rule of law. If accurate, those charges would mean that
a central and increasingly important component of the federal court system
is illegitimate. But attacks on MDL misconceive what it is. In terms of statu-
tory objectives, institutional design, and the way it operates, MDL is best un-
derstood as a form of hybrid public administration that mixes tools of
ordinary civil litigation with tools of public administration. As such, MDL is
properly evaluated through the administrative rule of law that evolved in the
decades following World War II and underpins the legitimacy of the modern
administrative state.
Approaching MDL as a form of public administration does not elimi-
nate concerns about its compliance with the rule of law. But it shows that
390 . See Silver & Miller, supra note 142, at 120 (“The MDL statute says nothing about
fees.”)
391 . See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975) (calling
modification of the American rule of attorney’s fees a “policy matter that Congress has re-
served for itself”). For the point that the Rules Enabling Act’s substance/procedure dichotomy
allocates power between Congress and the courts, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1106 (1982).
392 . See Silver & Miller, supra note 142, at 120–21. But see Burch, supra note 10, at 147–
48 (arguing that quantum meruit principles authorize the award of common benefit fees under
certain conditions).
393 . See, e .g ., David Shepardson, U .S . Appeals Court Upholds Volkswagen’s $10 Billion
Diesel Settlement, REUTERS (July 9, 2018, 12:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
volkswagen-emissions/u-s-appeals-court-upholds-volkswagens-10-billion-diesel-settlement-
idUSKBN1JZ21G [https://perma.cc/8BEH-2GRP]; Associated Press, Federal Judge Approves
NFL Concussion Settlement, NFL (July 7, 2014, 5:04 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story
/0ap2000000363672/article/federal-judge-approves-nfl-concussion-settlement [https://perma
.cc/7PAQ-85YU].
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critics’ focus on MDL’s ad hockery is misplaced. The greatest threat to
MDL’s legitimacy is the absence of structural features—guarantees of trans-
parency, participation, and ex post review—that played a key role in building
popular and legal support for the modern administrative state. Whether
MDL continues to be the preeminent forum for addressing intractable legal
problems depends in large part on whether it is able to incorporate those fea-
tures.
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